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The Uniform Arbitration Act-
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is an overview of recent court decisions that interpret state
versions of the Uniform Arbitration Act ("U.A.A.").' Arbitration statutes
patterned after the U.A.A. have been adopted by thirty-four states and the District
of Columbia.2 The goal of this project is to promote uniformity in the
interpretation of the U.A.A. by analyzing the various underlying policies and
rationales of recent court decisions interpreting the U.A.A. '
II. SECTION 1: VALIDITY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Section 1 of the U.A.A. provides that:
[a] written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration
or a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any
controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable
and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract. This act also applies to arbitration
agreements between employers and employees or between their
respective representative [unless otherwise provided in the agreement].
4
Our judiciary has been asked to decide a variety of issues raised by Section
1 of the U.A.A. When deciding any case involving an arbitration agreement, a
court must first decide if the parties involved have entered into a valid agreement.
To be valid, the agreement must satisfy all of the necessary conditions precedent.
* This project was written and prepared by Journal of Dispute Resolution candidates under the
direction of Associate Editor in Chief Kimberly D. Gibbens and Note and Comment Editor S. Christian
Mullgardt.
1. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1-25, 7 U.L.A. 5 (1985).
2. Jurisdictions which have adopted arbitration statutes based on the U.A.A include: Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming.
3. This Article surveys cases decided between January 1995 and December 1995.
4. U.A.A. § 1.
1
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If the court finds that the agreement is valid, the court must decide whether the
parties' dispute falls within the ambit of the agreement. Periodically, the courts
have also been called upon to decide what laws apply to the arbitration process
and when specific provisions in the parties' agreement, although contracted to,
may be void as a matter of law or public policy.
A. Technicalities of a Valid Agreement to Arbitrate
When determining whether or not an arbitration agreement is valid, the court
reviewing such an agreement must first determine whether certain threshold
requirements have been met. One of the threshold requirements is a consensual
understanding between the parties. A consensual understanding ensures that a
party is not forced into arbitrating a dispute.5 For an agreement to be valid,
Section 1 of the U.A.A. requires a written understanding between the parties
because it evidences a consensual understanding.6
A valid arbitration agreement between the parties must be found in every
case. In Mills v. J. Daunoras Constr., Inc.,7 the court required eachparty in the
arbitration to have been a party to the written understanding that the dispute would
be arbitrated.
In Mills, Daunoras Construction, Inc. ("Daunoras") and Venus Lounge, Inc.
("Venus") entered into a contract requiring Daunoras to perform work on property
owned by Venus.' The Mills9 filed a suit contending that Daunoras negligently,
carelessly, and/or recklessly damaged their property.' The lower court dismissed
Mills' claim with prejudice on the ground that the Mills were required to pursue
their action in an already pending arbitration." The trial judge felt that in order
to avoid inconsistent results, the Mills were indispensable to the resolution of the
bargained for arbitration clause.'2 The Mills, however, argued that even though
Taylor Mills was an officer of Venus, the Mills were not parties to the written
agreement between Venus and Daunoras which mandated arbitration of
disputes. 3
The court of appeals acknowledged that because the claims of both Venus
and the Mills stemmed from Daunoras' work, they were inextricably linked.' 4
5. Mills v. J. Daunoras Constr., Inc., 651 A.2d 114, 117 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div. 1995).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 115.
9. The Mills were the plaintiff property owners in this case whom brought the tort action for
property damage against Daunoras, a contractor.
10. Id
11. Id. The lower court felt that the pending arbitration between Venus and Daunoras was
addressing this issue. Id.
12. Id at 116.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 116-17.
[Vol. 1996, No. 2
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Despite this link, the court of appeals held that such an observation cannot lead
to the conclusion that all claims should be tried in one forum. 5 Instead, the
court of appeals noted that the Mills were not parties to the contract and that the
New Jersey Arbitration Act ("NJAA") requires that agreements to arbitrate be in
writing.'6 It is important to note that the court did not dismiss the case because
of the absence of a valid agreement. Instead, the court recognized that the NJAA
did not abolish common law arbitration which allows parties to submit a dispute
to an arbitrator by consent.'7 In light of the common law, the court of appeals
remanded the case, stating that if Mills and Venus consolidated their claims in the
submission to the arbitrator, they may have consented to arbitration and thus
waived their right to pursue litigation against Daunoras.'"
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine faced a technicality question in Maine
State Employees Association, SEIU v. Bureau of Employee Relations.9 In this
case, the Maine State Employees Association (MSEA), acting as a certified
bargaining agent for employees working for the executive branch of the state
government, had previously entered into a collective bargaining agreement with
the Bureau of Employee Relations ("Bureau"), a statutorily designated
representative for the executive branch in all collective bargaining activities.2
The collective bargaining agreement provided for salary grade progression on the
basis of satisfactory job performance and for the arbitration of all
disagreements.2' In March of 1992, the Maine Legislature enacted a law
prohibiting the implementation of merit increasesto state employees between July
1, 1992 and June 30, 1993.22
The MSEA filed a grievance on July 30, 1992, stating that the provision was
unconstitutional and that the dispute should be heard by an arbitrator.23 This
grievance, however, was filed one month after the collective bargaining agreement
had expired.24 The Maine Supreme Court noted that because the U.A.A.
mandates a written agreement to arbitrate, arbitration could not be compelled
because the only written contract between the parties had previously expired.25
Despite MSEA's argument that it had become common practice to arbitrate
grievances after the expiration of a contract, the court felt that the Bureau's
willingness to arbitrate some grievances could not be seen as an agreement to
arbitrate all grievances.26
15. Id. at 117.
16. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-1 (West 1987)).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 117-18.
19. 652 A.2d 654 (Me. 1995).
20. Id. at 654.
21. Id. The collective bargaining agreement at issue expired on June 30, 1992. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 654-55.
24. Id. at 654.
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When interpreting a document to decide if a valid agreement to arbitrate
exists, the courts must first look to the document itself." In Reed v. Davis
County School District, Mr. Reed and his wife were both employees of the Davis
County School District's Board of Education ("Board") under the terms of
employment between the Board and the Davis Education Association ("DEA").28
Mr. Reed had signed a contract designating the DEA as his exclusive bargaining
agent.
29
Pursuant to the Agreement, Mr. Reed sought to compel the Board to enter
into arbitration.30 The Board argued and the court agreed that the Agreement did
not contain an arbitration provision.3' The court looked at the unambiguous
words of the Agreement and decided that the Agreement between the Board and
the DEA did not explicitly contain the words "arbitration" or "arbitrate".32 Mr.
Reed, however, argued that the Board could be compelled to arbitrate under
"Article V" of the Agreement.
Article V sets forth the proper procedure for resolving any complaints of
educators for a violation or a misinterpretation of any of the provisions of the
Agreement.33 This grievance procedure contained a series of informal and formal
steps to properly resolve disputes.34 The court held that although it was Utah's
policy to favor arbitration, the parties had not agreed to arbitrate disputes. 5 The
court also noted that arbitration includes the presentation of conflicting claims to
a neutral third party for resolution.36 Because the clear language of the grievance
procedure did not meet this condition, the intent of the parties could not have been
to allow arbitration of disputes.
3 7
In Lancaster v. West,3 8 the Supreme Court of Arkansas decided whether a
valid written agreement to submit disputes to arbitration existed between an
employer and her former real estate associate.39 West, doing business as Classic
Realty Company of Conway, employed Lancaster as a sales associate from January





32. Id. at 1065.
33. Id.
34. Id. Informal attempts at resolution with the grievant's immediate supervisor were encouraged.
In addition, there was a four step formal procedure, involving a written complaint to the supervisor,
an appeal of the supervisor to the Superintendent of Schools, an appeal of the superintendent to a
"hearing examiner", and a direct hearing before the Board. Id.
35. Id
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1065-66. Furthermore, the grievance procedure provided that nothing contained therein
could be construed to limit the right of the parties to appeal to an appropriate court of law. The parties
intended the term "appeal" to mean an intervention of the courts, not the narrow confirmation review
contemplated in the Utah Arbitration Act Id
38. 891 S.W.2d 357 (Ark. 1995).
39. Id.
[Vol. 1996, No. 2
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25, 1991 to July 20, 1991.40 On July 10, 1991, Lancaster secured the execution
of an offer-and-acceptanceby the buyers and the seller for some farmland.4 On
July 22, 1991, two days after quitting her position at Classic Realty, Lancasterhad
the seller write "Void" on the instrument, effectively canceling the July 10 offer-
and-acceptance. 42 Afterwards, Lancaster arranged for a new offer-and-acceptance
contract between the buyers and the seller and then refused to pay West her share
of the commission on the sale.4" Both Lancaster and West were members of the
Conway Board of Realtors.'"
Lancaster argued that she could not be compelled to arbitrate under Arkansas'
provision of the Uniform Arbitration Act because that provision barred the
application of the Act to employer-employee disputes.4 The court determined
that the complaint did not fall under the employer-employee exceptionbecausethe
second contract was executed after Lancaster had severed her relationship with
Classic Realty and because the sale was consummated only through that second
contract.
46
The court also concluded that because the parties were associated with
different firms at the time the cause of action accrued, the mandatory arbitration
agreement established in Article 14 of the Realtors' Code of Ethics was
controlling.47 Because this mandatory arbitration agreement controlled, the court
held that the chancery court did not commit reversible error in finding that West
was entitled to the amount set forth in her arbitration award, giving her a
commission on the sale.48
Signatures on a contract maybe sufficient to bind parties to an agreement to
arbitrate if the language in the contract is clear and unambiguous.4 9  In Red
Springs Presbyterian Church, the plaintiff filed an action against the defendant, a
company in the business of termite and pest control, for inadequate and
unworkmanlike termite treatment and inspections, breach of contract, fraud, unfair
and deceptive trade practices, and failure to seek in good faith a resolution of
40. Id. at 358.
41. Id.
42. Id at 359.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 358.
45. Id. at 359. In 1991, Arkansas' version of the Uniform Arbitration Act barred the application
of the act to employer-employee disputes, personal injury or tort matters, and any insured or
beneficiary under any insurance policy or annuity contract ARKCODE ANN. § 16-108-201 (Michie
1987). In 1993, the statutory section was amended. The bar against application of the Act to
employer-employee disputes, however, remained in cases involving a written agreement to submit to
arbitration disputes arising between these parties. ARKCODE ANN. § 16-108-201 (Michie Supp. 1993).
46. Lancaster, 891 S.W.2d at 360.
47. Id. Article 14 of the Code of Ethics was approved by the Professional Standards Committee
and the Board of Directors of the National Association of Realtors and adopted by the Conway Board
of Realtors. Id.
48. Id. at 361.
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plaintiff's claim.5° The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the
signed contract mandated arbitration of this dispute.5" The plaintiff argued that
the arbitrationprovision was void because it was not independently negotiated, and
it cited several cases in which arbitration was not compelled because a party had
not signed the agreement.52 The court held that because the language in the
contract was clear and unambiguous, mutual assent was evidenced by the
signatures on the contract. Therefore, the court held that it was required to
interpret the contract as written to be valid under North Carolina's U.A.A., and it
compelled arbitration pursuant to the contract's arbitration provision."
In Curtis G. Testerman Co. v. E. Buck, II,"4 the court was required to look
at the signatures of the underlying contract to determine which parties had entered
a written agreement to arbitrate." Seeking damages for breach of contract,
negligence and violation of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act, Walter and
Gabrielle Buck ("Bucks") brought an action against the Curtis G. Testerman
Company and against Curtis G. Testerman ("Testerman") as an individual.56 The
dispute arose out of a construction contract in which the company failed to
complete an addition to the Bucks' house and various other improvements within
the specified time period."
Testernan argued that he was neither a party to the arbitration agreement nor
a signatory of the underlying contract and, therefore, could not be forced to
arbitrate his liability since he never agreed to resolve disputes through
arbitration.58 Testerman also claimed that he signed the contract in his capacity
as president of the company, not as an individual.59 The Bucks argued that
because the contract was executed in the name of "Curtis G. Testerman, Inc." and
not "Curtis G. Testerman Company," Testerman was personally liable because he
entered a contract on behalf of an unincorporated entity.6'
The court decided that a misnomer of a corporate name is not fatal where the
identity of the corporation is apparent.6' In particular, a corporation in a written
contract is deemed sufficiently named if there is enough expressed to indicate that
there is such an artificial being and to indicate that that artificial being can be
distinguished from all others.62 In this case, the court found that the
50. Id at 271.
51. Id at 272.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 273.
54. 667 A.2d 649 (Md. 1995).
55. Id at 654.




60. Id. at 652.
61. Id
62. Id (citing Seaboard Commercial Corp. v. Leventhal, 178 A. 922 (1935)).
[Vol. 1996, No. 2
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corporation's identity was apparent since there were no allegations that the Bucks
thought they were dealing with Testennan in his individual capacity.'
Alternatively, the Bucks contended that Testenran was subject to the
arbitration clause either as an agent or as a corporate officer of the company."
Addressing the first contention, the court stated that if Testerman fully disclosed
the identity of his principal, then he would not be subject to the agreement unless
the principal was nonexistent, fictitious, or legally incompetent.6' Captioned by
the title "President", Testerman's signature indicated that he signed in his capacity
as agent of the company, thereby fully disclosing the principal's identity.'
Addressing the Bucks' second contention, the court stated that although a
corporate officer may be liable for torts committed by his corporation, the officer
cannot be bound individually by a contract containing an arbitration agreement
unless he also consents to be bound by signing in his individual capacity.67 The
court held that based on the totality of the circumstances Testerman did not
individually agree to arbitrate; therefore, he was not bound by the written
agreement.68
This principle that only those who consent are bound by the written
agreement was also evident in Tom Savage Associates, Inc. v. Tetra Tech
Richardson, Inc.69 In Savage, the plaintiff entered into a contract with the State
of Delaware for certain work to be performed at a Women's Correctional
Facility. 7 The plaintiff argued that the bid package which was prepared by the
defendants as agents of the State of Delaware contained incomplete and inaccurate
information which the plaintiff relied on.7'
The plaintiff and its joint venture company, Nordic Construction, Inc., had
previously arbitrated their dispute with the State pursuant to a compulsory
arbitration provision and recovered on the theory of quantum mertit.72 Not only
were the defendants not parties to this arbitration agreement, but during this
arbitration the applicable Statute of Limitations for filing an action against the
defendants had run.7' Because the applicable statute of limitations had run, the
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 653.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 654.
69. No. CIV.A.94C-08-241, 1995 WL 48396 (Del. Super. CL Jan. 4, 1995).
70. Id. at*l.
71. Id.
72. Id. at * 1-2.
73. Id. The plaintifis only remedy against the defendants was, therefore, in a court of competent
jurisdiction. The plaintiff argued that the statute of limitations in this action against defendants should
have been tolled due to the pendency of its arbitration with the State. Id. at *3.
19961
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court held that the defendants' motion to dismiss the case should be granted.74
Therefore, the plaintiff's only remedy against the defendants, a suit in a court of
competent jurisdiction, was barred because the former arbitration proceeding,
involving the State of Delaware, did not toll the running of the statute of
limitations."
In Carris v. John R. Thomas and Associates," the Oklahoma Municipal
Power Authority ("OMPA") hired the architectural firm of John R. Thomas and
Associates ("firm") to design the plans for a construction project. In a separate
agreement OMPA hired Karen Carris ("Carris") to perform construction work on
the project.77 A dispute arose over the construction of a wheelchair ramp, in
which Carms did not comply with the specifications prepared by the firm, and
Canis invoked the arbitration clause contained in her contract with OMPA to
compel arbitration with OMPA.78 Although Thomas and the firm participated
as witnesses in the proceeding, they were neither parties to the contract nor to the
arbitration proceeding. 79
Subsequently, Canis filed suit against the firm and Thomas as an individual,
alleging that the plans were negligently prepared. 0 The trial court granted
summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the arbitration award
determined all of the issues in the negligence and fraud suits.8' The appellate
court affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding that the contractor had full
opportunity to litigate the issue of damages in the arbitration proceeding.Y
Upon review, however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that "although the
contractor's injuries may have arisen from the same set of facts," one claim was
based in contract and the other claim was based in tort. Therefore, since Canis
was prevented by the contract terms and the Uniform Arbitration Act from joining
the firm and Thomas unless they consented to arbitration, 4 the court held that
74. Id. at*4. The court found that all facts relevant to the plaintiff's claim against the defendants
had occurred and were known to the parties as of May 25, 1991, and, therefore, the cause of action
accrued at that time because it was not speculative or premature as of that date. Id. at *3. The court
reasoned that this case was analogous to the one in which the statute of limitations was not tolled
against an architect who was not a party to an arbitration proceeding. Id. (citing Framlau Corp. v.
Kling, 334 A.2d 780, 782-83 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975)).
75. Id. Since the action was not filed until August 26, 1994, the plaintiff's cause of action
against the defendants was time barred by 10 Del.Code § 8106. Id. at *4.
76. 896 P.2d 522 (Okia. 1995).
77. Id. at 525.
78. Id The arbitrator awarded Cards a portion of the amount due to her under the contract and





83. Id. at 526.
84. The court found that the firm and Thomas were not parties to the arbitration agreement, nor
did they voluntarily consent or agree to arbitrate any claims Caris had against them. Id. at 529.
[Vol. 1996, No. 2
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Carris' claims against the firm and Thomas could proceed separately and distinctly
from the claims she previously arbitrated with OMPA. 5
Additionally, state courts have attempted to determine outcomes based on
notice provisions which ensure consensual arbitration. In Casarotto v.
Lombardi, 6 the plaintiffs entered into a franchise agreement to operate a Subway
Sandwich Shop.' Though this agreement contained a provision requiring
arbitration of disputes, notice of this arbitration provision was not placed on the
front page of the franchise agreement as required by § 27-5-114(4), MCA.88
The court held that the notice requirement in Montana's version of the
U.A.A. would not be preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") because
this state law did not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress. 9 Justice Lephart also noted in his
concurring opinion that the notice provision merely protects the consumer by
requiring that notice be conspicuously placed on the front page of the contract.90
This protection furthers the policy of meaningful and consensual arbitration by
ensuring that a consumer who signs the usual nonnegotiated form contract
knowingly agrees to arbitration of disputes.9 As a result of the court's decision,
the plaintiffs were not compelled to arbitrate the dispute as stated in the franchise
agreement. Instead, the plaintiffs were allowed to file suit for breach of contract
and tortious conduct.'
The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed this decision in
Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto.93 The Court remanded this case for further
proceeding, holding that the Montana statute was inconsistent with and thus
preempted by the FAA.94 Acknowledging that the first-page notice requirement
would make the arbitration contract invalid, the court reasoned that the Montana
statute "singularly" limited the validity of arbitration agreements and, thus,
contradicted the "goals and policies" of the FAA.95
85. Id. at 530. The elements of claim or issue preclusion were not met and, therefore, Carris
could not be precluded from proceeding outside of arbitration with her claims against the firm and
Thomas. Id.
86. 901 P.2d 596 (Mont. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. CL 1652 (1996).
87. Id. at 597. The applicable state statute required that notice be 'typed in underlined capital
letters on the first page of the contract" for a contract subject to arbitration. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-
5-114(4) (1995).
88. Casarotto, 901 P.2d at 597.
89. Id. at 599.
90. Id. at 598-99.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 596.
93. 116 S.C. 1652 (1996).
94. Id. at 1657.
95. Id. The court noted that §2 of the FAA provides the only limits on the enforceability of
arbitration agreements: "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract," arbitration agreements shall be enforced. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. §2 (1947)).
19961
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Finally, the court must determine if the agreement between the parties was
intended to be an agreement to arbitrate. 96 In DiLucente Corp. v. Pennsylvania
Roofing Co., Inc., a general contractor ("Dilucente") brought an action against a
subcontractor ("Roofing") seeking to stay arbitration of a contract dispute.9 The
court had to decide if the parties had entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate.
98
When the parties agree to arbitration in a clear and unmistakable manner, every
reasonable effort will be made to favor such an agreement.9 Generally, contract
rules apply. As a result, the intent of the parties is ascertained by looking first at
the four comers of the document and the express language of the contract.1'°
Absent an express agreement between the parties to submit disputes to arbitration,
a court may not compel arbitration.'0 '
DiLucente argued that the case goes to court unless it elects otherwise.""
The court, however, held that the express language of the agreement would subject
all disputes to arbitration unless Roofing notified DiLucente and received
DiLucente's approval to pursue the claim in court." 3 Therefore, because
DiLucente was bound by the terms of the contract into which it willingly entered,
it was not entitled to enjoin arbitration.0 4
According to Pennsylvania law, when an arbitration agreement is not clear
as to whether common law or statutory arbitration rules apply, common law rules
regulate the enforcement of the agreement unless the parties stipulate
otherwise. 5 In Patton v. J. C. Penney Ins. Co., the court held that the statutory
rules govern because the insurance policies provided that the arbitrations shall be
conducted in accordance with the U.A.A. °6 Similarly, in Cotterman v. Allstate
Ins. Co., the court held that an automobile policy provision stating that arbitration
would take place as provided under the Uniform Arbitration Acts of 1927 and
1980 had expressly provided that the statutory arbitration rules govern the
provision."1
96. Dilucente Corp. v. Pennsylvania Roofing, Inc., 655 A.2d 1035 (Pa. Super. CL 1995).
97. Id. at 1036.
98. Id. Pennsylvania Roofing gave DiLucente written notice of its intention to arbitrate their
unresolved dispute prior to filing a demand for arbitration. DiLucente filed a motion for injunction
seeking to enjoin arbitration proceedings. DiLuncente appealed after having its motion denied by the
trial judge. Id. at 1036-37.




103. Id. "Roofing did not choose the option of filing a lawsuit in court," but instead "notified
DiLucente that it intended to file a demand for arbitration." Id.
104. Id. DiLucente could have only overruled Roofing's decision if Roofing had filed a suit in
court, at which time DiLucente could have forced arbitration. Under the contract, however, DiLucente
did not have the power to overrule Roofing's decision to arbitrate. Id
105. Patton v. J.C. Penney Ins. Co., 665 A.2d 510, 512 (Pa. Super. Ct 1995); Cotterman v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 666 A.2d 695, 697 (Pa. Super. CL 1995).
106. Patton, 665 A.2d at 512.
107. Cotterman, 666 A.2d at 697.
[Vol. 1996, No. 2
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B. Scope of the Agreement
Once it is proven that an agreement to arbitrate exists, the arbitration clause
will be liberally read and construed in favor of arbitration unless the clause
positively cannot be interpreted to cover the asserted dispute."" In KKM
Medical, MCS and KKM entered into a contract for the design and construction
of a medical office building."° KKM filed a demand for arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the contract."0 MCS petitioned the court to find
that there was "no binding agreement to arbitrate. . . because the arbitration
agreement was null and void by the failure of a condition precedent to its
effectiveness.""' The court stated that because it could not positively state that
the arbitration clause did not cover the parties' dispute, the agreement would be
construed in favor of arbitration.1
2
Typically, when a party to an agreement seeks to avoid arbitration, the
judiciary is asked to determine whether the dispute involved comes within the
ambit of the arbitration provision."3 In Allstate Ins. Co. v. McBride, Allstate
petitioned the court to declare that McBride was not entitled to underinsured
motorist coverage which she claimed under her automobile insurance policy." 4
Allstate relied upon a waiver form which allegedly contained McBride's
signature."' McBride argued that her signature was forged on the waiver form
and that pursuant to her insurance policy the dispute should be subject to
arbitration." 6  Arguing that McBride essentially requested reformation of the
contract, Allstate stated that such a request was outside the scope of the arbitration
clause." 7
The court noted that Pennsylvania courts interpreting clauses similar to the
one at issue in McBride have found a wide range of disputes to fall within the
scope of the arbitration agreement."' The court held that because Pennsylvania
law affords arbitrators of disputes broad authority, the matter was within the ambit
108. See Testerman, 667 A.2d at 655; State ex rel. MCS Bldg. Co. v. KKM Medical, 896 S.W.2d
51, 53 (Mo. Ct App. 1995).
109. Id. at 52.
110. Id. at 52.
111. Id. The contract stated that if a lease was not obtained from a local hospital "... by the
commencement date, then unless the parties agree otherwise, [the] provisions of this Contract except
for those contained in Part I and Part IV... shall be null and void." Id.
112. Id. at 53.
113. Allstate Ins. Co. v. McBride, No. CIV.A.94-6469, 1995 WL 3693, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3,
1995).
114. Id. at *1.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at *2. The policy stated that disputes regarding the insured's "right to receive damages
or the amount of those damages, ... will be settled by arbitration as provided under the Pennsylvania
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of the insurance policy's arbitration clause." 9 Once a dispute is determined to
be arbitrable, the arbitrator is typically authorized to decide all matters necessary
to dispose of the claim.2 0
The decision in United States v. Miller-Stauch Construction Co.,'
2 1
illustrated the principal that it is incumbent upon the side seeking to compel
arbitration to show that the parties' agreement to arbitrate encompasses their
claims.12 2 In Miller-Staunch, the United States contracted with Miller-Stauch for
the construction of a child care facility.'" As part of this construction, Miller-
Stauch entered into a subcontract in which Tech Coatings would provide and apply
all special coatings for the facility. 24 Tech Coatings alleged that Miller-Stauch
failed to pay the contractual price after Tech Coatings performed its contractual
obligations.'25
Miller-Stauch sought to compel arbitration of this dispute, citing both the
Kansas Uniform Arbitration Act and the FAA.'26 Miller-Stauch's subcontract
addendum deleted the arbitrationparagraphs in the original contract and substituted
dispute resolution paragraphs containing language from the Contract Dispute
Act. 127 The court held that Miller-Stauch failed to prove that the dispute was
one in which the parties had agreed to arbitrate because the dispute resolution
procedures that the defendant sought to enforce did not apply to disputes
exclusively between the subcontractor and the prime contractor.2
In FCR Greensboro, Inc. v. C & Mlnvestments of High Point, Inc.,129 the
parties entered into an agreement in which the defendant agreed to construct and
lease to plaintiff, FCR Greensboro, Inc., a building to be used for recycling
operations. 30 Because the construction project did not begin on time, the parties
entered into a written arbitration agreement to arbitrate the differences which had
119. Id at*4.
120. Id at *2. (citing Brennan v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp., 574 A.2d 580,
583 (Pa. 1990).
121. 904 F.Supp. 1209 (D. Kan. 1995).
122. Id at 1213. "Neither party devotes any portion of their briefs to discussing the particular
terms of Article 14 of the subcontract or to arguing whether their dispute falls within the scope of
claims or controversies subject to the mandatory dispute resolution procedure." Id.
123. Id at 1211.
124. Id
125. Id
126. Id at 1213.
127. Id. at n.3. See 41 U.S.C, § 601, et seq. (1994). The scope of the Contract Disputes Act
is narrow and typically only governs disputes "in which the government is a party and makes no
provision for disputes or claims between contractors." Id. at 1211-12. Similarly, Paragraph 14.2 of Ahe
parties' agreement stated in part, "Where the dispute is solely between the Contractor and
Subcontractor and does not involve the Owner, all such disputes shall be resolved in the Circuit Court
of Jackson County, Missouri" Id. at n.2.
128. Id at 1213.
129. 459 S.E.2d 292 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).
130. Id.
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arisen with respect to liquidated damages, weather delays, and tenant change
orders.13
The defendant argued that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by awarding
liquidated damages which were not within the scope of the agreement by granting
the plaintiff reimbursement for additions to a sprinkler system.'32 The defendant
contended that the latter award did not fall within the scope of the agreement
which involved only disputes regarding "claimed liquidated damages" or "claimed
tenant change orders.'W
33
The court stated that because the duty to arbitrate is contractual, a dispute can
only be arbitrated if the parties agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration and if
one can ascertain from the language in the agreement that the claim falls within
the scope of the arbitration agreement.'34 The court held that it was apparent
from the arbitration agreement that the parties did not contemplate liquidated
damages for the delay of starting construction of the facility, but instead, intended
such damages for any delay that extends construction beyond the agreed upon
completion date.
35
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Hiller,136 the court found that when the
dispute is within the scope of the agreement, the claimant may proceed,
notwithstanding the fact that his arguments are based in part on legal and public
policy challenges, to other provisions in the agreement.
37
In this case, Aetna issued an insurance policy to George S. Maier Co. of
which John Hiller was the sole shareholder. 3 When Hiller was killed by a
drunk driver, his parents brought this action as administrators of his estate.'39
Aetna argued that a dispute is beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement when
the issue is whether a policy provision has violated "legislative or administrative
mandates or public policy."' 40 The court concluded that under Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins, 4' Pennsylvania law applied and that the dispute fell within the
scope of the agreement, stating that under such contracts arbitration was mandated
when the insured and the insurer disagreed as to when a party is legally entitled
to recover damages.142
In Miller v. Two State Construction Co., Inc.,143 Ms. Miller and Ms. Kellar,
who ran a small painting subcontracting firm, entered into a contract with
131. Id.
132. Id. at 294.
133. Id. at 295.
134. Id. at 294.
135. Id.
136. No. CIV. A. 95-144, 1995 WL 322640 (E.D. Pa. May 25, 1995).
137. Id at *2.
138. Id. at *1.
139. Id
140. Id.
141. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
142. Hiller, 1995 WL 322640 at 1-2.
.143. 455 S.E.2d 678 (N.C. CL. App. 1995).
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defendant to paint three inns. 44 Miller and Kellar were the only female
subcontractors. They were subjected to "lewd remarks," "grabb[ing] of [their]
buttocks," and "spanking.' 43 In addition, a dispute arose as to the scope of the
work.' 46 The defendant demanded arbitration while the plaintiffs filed suit in
the General Court of Justice. 147  Though the trial judge concluded that an
arbitration agreement existed, he held that the arbitration provision was
unconscionable and unenforceable under North Carolina law because it forced the
plaintiffs to waive their right to a jury trial. 48 The court of appeals, however,
disagreed and stated that once an agreement to arbitrate is found, courts should not
only take a "step back and take a hands-off attitude during the arbitration
proceeding," but [they] should also resolve all doubts involving the scope of the
agreement in favor of arbitration. '41 Moreover, the court found that there was
no bar to arbitrating claims based on tortious conduct, unfair and deceptive trade
practices, or for punitive damages as long as they arise out of or relate to a
contract that provides for arbitration of its breach. 50
In Greenwoodv. Sherfield, the Missouri Court of Appeals decided that a tort
claim could only be characterized as "arising out of or related to" a contract if it
at least raises some issue 'which requires reference to or coDDstrction of some
portion of the contract for its resolution.'' Further, a dispute cannot sufficiently
"arise out of or [be] related to" a contract "simply because the dispute would not
have arisen absent the existence of the contract between the parties.' 52 The
Greenwood court held that in a catalog merchant's action against a retailer and its
manager for tortious interferencewith that merchant's contract to sell his business,
arbitration could not be compelled'53 because there was "no meaningful
connection between [the] [p]laintiffs' tort claim and the terms, conditions, or
subject matter of the Merchant Contract.', 5 4
Sometimes courts are asked to interpret what was intended by the language
of the agreement. In May Construction Co. v. Benton School District No. 8,'"
the school district brought suit against a contractor who built a middle school,
alleging that the appearance of the floors was unacceptable.'56 May Construction
requested that the school district be compelled to arbitrate.'57 The school district





149. Id. at 680.
150. Id. at 681.
151. Greenwood, 895 S.W.2d 169, 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id at 175.
155. 895 S.W.2d 521 (Ark. 1995).
156. Id at 522.
157. Id
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responded that claims relating to "aesthetic effect" are not subject to arbitration
under the terms of the agreement. 58
The Arkansas Supreme Court acknowledged that "arbitration agreements will
not be construed to include only subjects within the strict letter of the agreement
but will be construed to include subjects within the spirit of the agreement."'59
The court agreed with the school district, however, and held that the claim was
related to "aesthetic effect" and, therefore, was not within the scope of the
arbitration agreement. 60
C. Void As a Matter of Law or Public Policy
It is possible that a seemingly valid agreement to arbitrate may be
unenforceable as a matter of law. In Lambdin v. District Court,6' an employee
brought an original action seeking to compel the district court to allow him to
litigate rather than arbitrate his claims against his former employer, Sun
Microsystems ("Sun"). 62 Sun argued that the arbitration provision of a Sales
Representative Incentive Compensation Plan governed the dispute pursuant to the
Colorado Uniform Arbitration Act. 63 Sun further argued that because this valid
arbitration agreement was in force, the court lacked jurisdiction.1"' The issue
the court addressed was whether the Colorado Wage Claim Act ("Claim Act")
prohibited employers from requiring employees to submit disputes over
compensation to arbitration.
65
The Claim Act entitles an employee to all wages earned and provides that
upon termination of employment, "wages or compensation become due and
payable on the next regular payday."'" The Claim Act also entitles an
employee to commence a civil action in court to pursue these claims.61 These
rights cannot be waived.' The court agreed with the plaintiff and held that an
agreement to arbitrate that conflicts with the rights established by the Claim Act
158. Id.
159. Id. at 523.
160. Id The contract only required arbitration for any controversy or claim arising out of or
related to the contract or the breach thereof. Id
161. 903 P.2d 1126 (Colo. 1995).
162. Id at 1127.
163. Id. at 1128.
164. Id. The trial court "directed that the case proceed to binding arbitration under the ...
Compensation Plan's arbitration clause." Id This clause determined the applicable law and venue.
Id
165. Id at 1127.
166. Id. at 1129.
167. Id. Section 8-4-125 of the Wage Claim Act states: "Any agreement, written or oral, by any
employee purporting to waive or to modify his rights in Violation of this article shall be void." COLo.
REV. STAT. § 8-4-125 (1986 & 1994 Supp.).
168. Lambdin, 903 P.2d at 1129.
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cannot be enforced. 69  It stated, "We hold that the UAA cannot breathe life
into an arbitration agreement that the Wage Claim Act deems void."'
70
In Raytown Consolidated School District No. 2 v. American Arbitration
Ass 'n,"' the school district refused to arbitrate a contract dispute with Citizens
Bank of Edina because the school district's contract was with Interstate Insulation
of America. 72  The Bank had only obtained the rights to collect Interstate's
accounts receivable through bankruptcy proceedings.'73 Interstate originally filed
for arbitration claiming payment for asbestos removal. 74 Interstate's arbitration
claim was filed pursuant to its contract with the school district and before
Interstate was forced into bankruptcy. 75
The school district argued that Mo. Rev. Stat. § 435.465 made it "immune"
from the bank's arbitration action by effectively preventing governmental
subdivisions from arbitrating against their will.176 The court, however, decided
that § 435.465.1 applies to agreements between a commercial person and a
governmental body.'77 The only agreements not covered by the Uniform
Arbitration Act are those between two governmental bodies. 7 s Because in this
case the contract was "between a governmental entity and a commercial person,
the statute [did] not exempt the school district from arbitrating the claim."" 9
In two cases brought in the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas, it was argued that the arbitration clauses were void and unenforceable
because they violated Kansas law.180
FederatedRural Electric Insurance Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.
involved a dispute between insurance companies over the terms and obligations
created by two reinsurance treaties.' Under the terms of the treaties,
Nationwide agreed to reinsure and indenmify Federated for certain losses under
policies insuring risks in Kansas."z  Both treaties contained clauses which
provided that disputes arising out of the treaties be submitted to arbitration and
that this arbitration would take place in Ohio. A dispute arose, however,
when Federated demanded arbitration following Nationwide's refusal to pay
169. Id. at 1130.
170. Id.
171. 907 S.W.2d 189 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
172. Id. at 190.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 190-91.
175. Id.




180. Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 874 F. Supp. 1204 (D. Kan.
1995); Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Co. v. International Ins. Co. 884 F. Supp. 439 (D. Kan. 1995).
181 . Nationwide Mutual, 874 F. Supp at 1205.
182. Id.
183. Id
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amounts that Federated claimed were due.'84 Federated then claimed that the
arbitration provisions were void and unenforceable under the laws of Kansas and
filed a suit in state court alleging breach of contract.8 5
Federated contended that the Kansas version of the Uniform Arbitration Act
excludes agreements related to insurance contracts from its definition of
enforceable arbitration agreements. 86 The court, however, determined that this
argument failed because a federal court must apply the law of the state in which
it sits, including that state's choice of law rules. In that case, the federal court had
to follow the law of the Kansas courts which apply the rule of lex loci contractus
when the case involves interpretation of a contract."8 7 Accordingly, the court
found that the reinsurance treaties were issued in Ohio and Ohio law governs. 8
Since Ohio's version of the Uniform Arbitration Act contained no exclusion of
insurance contracts, the agreements were treated as valid and enforceable.'8 9
Furthermore, the parties identified no other Ohio law which would exclude
insurance disputes from the scope of arbitration.' 90
FederatedRural Electric Insurance v. International Insurance Co. is almost
identical to Nationwide Mutual.'9 ' In International Insurance Co., Federated
urged the court to certify to the Kansas Supreme Court the question of whether
Kansas public policy would render the arbitration provisions unenforceable.1
2
The U.S. District Court in Kansas again concluded that there was sufficient case
law to support a decision that Kansas did not have a strong enough public policy
to render arbitration provisions unenforceable.' 93
III. SECTION 2: PROCEEDINGS TO COMPEL OR STAY ARBITRATION
Section 2 of the U.A.A. governs proceedings to compel or stay
arbitration.'94 In such a proceeding, the party seeking to compel or stay
arbitration must show that an agreement to arbitrate exists and that the other party
184. Id. Federated argued that Nationwide should be precluded or estopped from asserting
arbitration provisions contained in the reinsurance treaties because Nationwide breached the Submission
to Arbitration agreement by refusing to complete the process for selecting arbitrators. Id
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1207. Because "this provision is a law enacted for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance," it invokes the Ferguson Act. Id.
187. Id. The rule of lex loci contractus states that the law of the place where the contract was
made is applicable. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. Federated also argued that Kansas would not enforce the laws of another state if they
violated its public policy. Id. The court concluded that Kansas public policy was not violated. LI at
1208.
191. International, 884 F. Supp. at 441.
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refuses to participate in the arbitration process. 95 Upon a party's motion to
compel or stay arbitration, a court must decide: 1) whether there is a valid,
written agreement to arbitrate, 2) whether the agreement covers the disputed issue,
and 3) whether a party has waived its right to participate in an arbitration
proceeding.
196
A. The Existence of an Agreement Between the Parties
"Arbitration is a matter of contract and absent an agreement between the
parties to arbitrate an issue, they cannot be compelled to arbitrate."'" Section
2 of the U.A.A. requires the party asking to compel arbitration to first show the
existence of an agreement to arbitrate.' 98 In Curtis G. Testerman Co. v.
Buck, 99 the Bucks brought a breach of contract action against the Curtis G.
Testerman Co. ("Company") and Curtis Testerman.2" ° The Company sought to
compel arbitration pursuant to the agreement between the parties.2 ' After the
Company's motion to compel was granted, the Bucks sought to compel Testerman
in his individual capacity into the arbitration.2"
The court held that Testerman could not be compelled to participate in the.
arbitration proceeding since Testerman did not sign the contract in an individual
capacity." This refusal to extend the arbitration agreement to Testerman was
based on the "consensual" nature of arbitration proceedings.2°  Without an
express agreement between two parties, a non-signatory will not be compelled to
arbitrate. 205 A non-signatory seeking to join an arbitration, however, may be
permitted to join since the danger of forcing parties into arbitration against their
will would be eradicated. 2°
The Testerman court enunciated four situations when a non-signatory could
be bound under an arbitration clause: (1) if the corporate veil is pierced to hold
the party bound as the alter ego; (2) if there is a common bill of lading that
expressly incorporates another contract's arbitration clause; (3) if an agreement to
arbitrate is implied through the conduct of the parties; and (4) under certain
circumstances, if a non-signatory seeks to enforce an arbitration agreement
195. U.A.A. § 2(a).
196. Stinson-Head, Inc. v. City of Sanibel, 661 So. 2d 119, 120 (Fla. Dist CL App. 1995). See
also H.L. Libby Corp. v. Skelly and Loy, Inc., 910 F. Supp. 195, 199 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
197. H.L. Libby, 910 F. Supp. at 199.
198. U.A.A. § 2(a).
199. 667 A.2d 649 (Md. 1995).
200. Id at 651.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 653.
204. Id at 654.
205. Id
206. Id. at 655.
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contained in a contract that the non-signatory signed on behalf of its principal." 7
Finding that none of these four situations applied and that the parties to the
agreement did not intend to bind Testerman in his individual capacity, the court
refused to compel Testerman to arbitrate. 8
In Maine State Employees Ass' v. Bureau of Employee Relations,2 9 the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine refused to extend past its expiration date a
collective bargaining agreement containing a provision compelling arbitration."'
The court reasoned that the expired agreement did not meet the U.A.A.'s
requirement of a written agreement .21  The court further refused to extend a
possible statutory duty to arbitrate as a substitute for a written agreement.
12
In DiLucente Corp. v. Pennsylvania Roofing Co.,213 a party to a contract
suit sought to stay arbitration proceedings." 4 The contract between the parties
stated, "[iun case of any dispute or disagreement under this agreement, or with
respect to any other work performed on the job site, it is agreed that such dispute
shall be submitted to the American Arbitration Association under the rules then
pertaining to contractors or construction disputes. "21' The court held that in the
absence of an express provision providing that the governing law was to be the
U.A.A., the dispute would be decided under common law arbitration rules.2 6
In Mahnke v. Maryland Casualty Co.,217 the Mahnkes filed suit alleging
that the insurance company in bad faith refused to agree on an arbitrator to decide
their dispute.2" The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania dismissed the Mahnkes' claim for medical expenses and their claim
of bad faith for failure to assert a claim.219 The court then advised the plaintiffs
to pursue their claim through the arbitration process under the U.A.A. since there
was an agreement to arbitrate.220
207. Id. at 656.
208. Id. at 657-58.
209. 652 A.2d 654 (Me. 1995).
210. Id. at 655.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. 655 A.2d 1035 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
214. Id. at 1037.
215. Id. at 1036.
216. Id. at 1037 n.2.
217. No. CIV.A.95-3208, 1995 WL 574371 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
218. Id. at *3.
219. Id. at *2-3.
220. Id. at *3.
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B. The Scope of the Agreement to Arbitrate
Once a court has determined that there is a valid agreement to arbitrate, it
must decide if the disputed issue is covered under that agreement.221 The
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania in Chester Upland School District v.
McLaughlin 22 overruled its previous holdings when it determined that an
"arbitrator has sole discretion in the first instance to decide whether an issue is
arbitrable. s223
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Nodak Mutual Insurance Co. ,224 the Supreme
Court of North Dakota stated that under "the Uniform Arbitration Act, any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration. '225 In Nodak Mutual, the trial court construed one party's motion
for declaratory judgment as a proceeding to compel arbitration.226 The North
Dakota Supreme Court ruled that the U.A.A. placed no limitations on arbitrators
other than those in the contract between the parties to decide issues of law and
fact.227 Once it is found that an agreement to arbitrate exists and that the dispute
is covered by the scope of the agreement, the arbitrator is deemed the judge of the
legal and factual issues in c11tro-esj.228
In United States v. Miller-Stauch Construction Co.,229 the United States
District Court in Kansas held that since a party cannot be forced to arbitrate absent
an agreement to do so, contract interpretation plays a large role in determining the
existence and the scope of an agreement.230 The party seeking to compel
arbitration has the burden of establishing that an arbitration agreement exists and
that the dispute is within the scope of that agreement.23'
In May Construction Co. v. Benton School District No. 8 ,23 2 the Supreme
Court of Arkansas extended the rules for constructing and interpreting contracts
to cover arbitration agreements as well.233 Through this extension, the court
sought to expand the scope of arbitration agreements "beyond the face of the
agreement" to give effect to the intent of the parties making the agreement.234
221. City of Sanibel, 661 So. 2d at 120 (quoting Piercy v. Bd. of Washington County, 576 So.
2d 806, 807 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
222. 655 A.2d 621 (Pa. Conumw. Ct 1995).
223. Id. at 629.
224. 540 N.W.2d 614 (N.D. 1995).
225. Id. at 619.
226. Id. at 616.
227. Id. at 617.
228. Id. at 617-18.
229. 904 F. Supp. 1209 (D. Kan. 1995).
230. Id. at 1213.
231. Id
232. 895 S.W.2d 521 (Ark. 1995).
233. Id at 523.
234. Id
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To encompass subjects falling within the "spirit" of the agreement, the court stated
that any areas of doubt or ambiguity should be decided in favor of arbitration.2"'
In Caretti, Inc. v. Colonnade Limited Partnership,2" the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland enforced the language of an agreement to arbitrate strictly,
even though this strict interpretation clearly disadvantaged one of the parties by
disallowing its claim." 7 The court suggested that the agreement should have
been more carefully constructed and declined to adjudicate the merits of the
case.
238
In Pioneer Water and Sewer District v. Civil Engineering Professionals,
Inc.,239 Civil Engineering Professionals ("CEP") sought to stay arbitration
proceedings on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired.240 The
agreement between the parties stated that no demand for arbitration could be made
after the statute of limitations for any equitable or legal proceeding had rmn.
241
The Supreme Court of Wyoming determined that the agreement was valid and that
the statute of limitations clause could be used in a court's preliminary
determination of whether there was a valid agreement to arbitrate.242 The court
concluded that the statute of limitations had expired and affirmed the lower court's
decision to grant the motion to stay the arbitration proceedings.
243
In Charles Shaid of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. George Hyman Construction
Co.,2" the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
decided the case under the F.A.A.245 Since the U.A.A., F.A.A., and case law
are "functionally equivalent"246 on the issue of whether an agreement to arbitrate
existed, the outcomes under each would be the same.247 If a court makes the
initial determination that an arbitration agreement exists and that the dispute is
covered by that agreement, it must compel arbitration without considering the
merits of the case.2 48 When deciding the scope of the agreement, the court must
give great deference to the intent of the parties as that intent is evidenced in the
words of the agreement.24 9
235. Id
236. 655 A.2d 64 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1995).
237. Id at 66.
238. Id at 67.
239. 905 P.2d 1245 (Wyo. 1995).
240. Id at 1246.
241. Id
242. Id at 1247.
243. Id
244. No. CIV.A.92-3654, 1995 WL 46702 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
245. Id at *I.
246. Id. atl In.1.
247. Id.
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C. Waiver of the Right to Arbitrate
A court may determine that the parties have waived their right to arbitrate a
dispute, even though a valid agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties and
even though the dispute is covered under the scope of the agreement.250 In
Northland Insurance Co. v. Kellogg,25' the Court of Appeals of Oklahoma
provided a six-factor test to determine whether an agreement to arbitrate has been
waived:
(1) [Wlhether a party has taken actions that are inconsistent
with a right to arbitrate;
(2) [Wjhether the issue of arbitration was raised only after
there had been significant preparation for litigation;
(3) [Wlhether the trial date is near or there has been a long
delay in raising the issue of contractual arbitration
rights;
(4) [W]hether the party invoking the arbitration right has
filed pleadings in the litigation without seeking a stay of
the proceedings;
(5) [Wjhether the party seeking arbitration has engaged in
discovery proceedings that are not available in
arbitration or participated in other "important
intervening steps;" and,
(6) [W]hetherthe opposing party has been prejudiced by the
delay.2
5 2
The court further stated that the facts and circumstances of each case should be
examined.253 Any evidence revealed by this examination of a party acting in
bad faith to delay or to harass another party would provide the basis for finding
that such party had waived its right to arbitrateY.2 4 The appellate court found
that the trial court had correctly decided the issues in this case, and it affirmed the
trial court on the basis of the underlying factual determinations.21"
In Yandell v. Church Mutual Insurance Co.,256 the driver filed an action
against the insurance company to recover underinsured motorist benefits.257
When the insurance company asserted its right to arbitrate, the driver claimed that
the insurance company had waived those rights.258 On appeal, the Appellate
Court of Illinois determined that a waiver would occur when a party acted
250. City of Sanibel, 661 So. 2d at 120.
251. 897 P.2d 1161 (Okia. CL App. 1995).
252. Id. at 1162. The court determined that the prejudice involved in the sixth factor must result
from the delay in asserting the right to arbitrate and not in the arbitration process itself. Id.
253. Id. at 1163.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. 654 N.E.2d 1388 (Ill App. CL 1995).
257. Id. at 1389.
258. Id.
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inconsistently with the arbitration clause in the agreement, such as indicating an
"abandonment" of the right to arbitrate.259 The court held that the insurance
company's failure to properly assert its right to arbitrate within a reasonable time
constituted a waiverbecausethe insurance company failed to follow the provisions
of the arbitration agreement.2"'
The insurance company also argued that it was not estopped from raising its
right to arbitrate.261 The court stated that to estop the insurance company from
raising its right to arbitrate, the driver must establish that the insurance company
misled him, that he relied on those misrepresentations, and that he was prejudiced
by the insurance company's actions.262 The driver was unaware of the
arbitration agreement because the insurance company refused to answer his
numerous requests for a complete copy of the insurance policy until after the suit
was filed.263 The defendant waited over eight months after the plaintiff filed suit
to assert his arbitration rights.26' The court concluded that these facts were
sufficient to support a finding that the defendant was estopped from asserting his
arbitration rights. 265
IV. SECTION 4: MAJORITY ACTION BY ARBITRATORS
Section 4 of the U.A.A. provides that arbitrators may exercise their power by
a majority except where otherwise provided by the arbitration agreement or the
U.A.A. 266
In Linzey v. Carrion,267 a medical malpractice claim was submitted to
arbitration under Maryland's Health Claims Arbitration Act.268 In a 2 to 1 vote,
the arbitration panel found in favor of the patient.269 The doctor filed a motion
with the arbitration panel requesting it to modify the award to reflect the 2 to 1
vote.270 The chairman of the arbitration panel, however, denied the motion.2
259. Id. at 1390.
260. Id.





266. See U.A.A. § 4.
267. 652 A.2d 1154 (Md. ct. Spec. App. 1995), rev 'd, 675 A.2d 527 (Md. CL App. 1996). The
court of appeals stated that it reversed the decision of the special court of appeals due to the specific
fazts of 1he case at hand, but the court of appeals clearly noted that it agmed with the ftsmo ,vok of
the special court of appeal's anaysis. Id
268. Id. a 1155. (citing MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRtOC. §3.2A.01 (1995)).
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At trial, the doctor made a motion in limine that any reference to the
arbitration award should be qualified as a non-unanimous decision.272 The trial
court denied the motion and stated that the jury would not be informed that the
award was made by a 2 to I vote, nor would a suggestion be made to the jury that
the award was unanimous.27
After the jury returned a verdict for the patient, the doctor appealed and
claimed that the non-disclosure of the 2 to I vote was contrary to Health Claims
Arbitration Act.27 4  The court of appeals stated that a court should properly
inform the jury that the decision of a majority of the arbitration panel is presumed
to be correct.275  Furthermore, although a court's disclosure of the non-
unanimous vote alone will not prejudice either party, the court held that informing
the jury that one member of the arbitration panel dissented from the award was
"improper" and "prejudicial" because it would "undermine the presumption of
correctness of the award and thus defeat a major purpose of the Act."27 6 Lastly,
the court explained that if one party does discover the panel's vote, it is collateral
to the issue before the jury and cannot be established by evidence if it is disputed
or not stipulated to by the opposing party. 7
V. SECTION 5: HEARiNG
Section 5 of the U.A.A. governs the actual arbitration hearing.27 The
procedures outlined in this section are to be followed in the hearing unless
otherwise determined by an agreement between the parties. 27'
In Lancaster v. West,280 West filed a request for arbitration with the Board
of Realtors against Lancaster concerning the sales commission from a real estate
contract Lancaster executed while working for West.28' After Lancaster had
secured the real estate contract, she quit her job, canceledthe contract, re-executed
the contract, and refused to pay West her share of the commission on the sale. 22
At the arbitration hearing, the Board awarded West an amount equal to the
commission from the sale.2" On appeal, Lancaster asserted that she did not




275. Id. at 1158.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1159.
278. U.A.A. § 5.
279. Id.
280. 891 S.W.2d 357 (Ark. 1995).
281. Id. at 358-59.
282. Id
283. Id. at 359.
284. Id. at 360.
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evidence showed that defects existed in the notice provided to the parties,285 the
notice requirements were satisfied because Lancaster herself had called to
determine the hearing date and had requested that the actual hearing be
postponed. 286 Furthermore, by appearing at the hearing, Lancaster waived any
right to assert lack of proper notice under the statutory provisions.287
VI. SECTION 7: WITNESSES, SUBPOENAS, DEPOSITIONS
Section 7 of the U.A.A. governs the arbitrator's ability to subpoena witnesses
and other evidence and to permit the taking of depositions. 2"8
In Cotterman v. Allstate Insurance Co.,2  Allstate appealed an unfavorable
arbitration award on the grounds that Allstate was denied a fair hearing when the
arbitrator did not permit Allstate to depose the plaintiff prior to the hearing.29
The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that Section 7(b) 291 was not applicable in
this case because the plaintiff was available and capable of being subpoenaed for
the hearing and also attended the hearing. 29 2 The court, however, did interpret
the statute's language, "may permit", as giving the arbitrator the final discretion
to order a deposition. 293 Based on the arbitrator's discretion in this matter, the
court affirmed the arbitrator's determination that the plaintiff's deposition was not
a "condition precedent" to a fair hearing.294
The dispute in National Avenue Building Co. v. Stewart295 involved an
arbitration award between a landowner and a contractor.296 The Missouri Court
of Appeals refused to vacate the award on the basis that the parties were not
allowed unlimited discovery. 297 The court explained that the very nature of
arbitration requires participation without the same level of preparation as
litigation.298 Generally, civil discovery rules are unavailable to arbitration
285. Id. at 361.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. U.A.A. § 7.
289. 666 A.2d 695 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
290. I d. at 699.
291. U.A.A. § 7(b) provides: On application of a party and for use as evidence, the arbitrators
may permit a deposition to be taken of a witness who cannot be subpoenaed or who is unable to attend
the hearing in the manner and upon the terms designated by the arbitrators.
292. Conerman, 666 A.2d at 700.
293. Id
294. Id.
295. 910 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. C- App. 1995).
296. Id at 334.
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participants because extensive discovery thwarts the goals of arbitration, mainly
a less costly alternative to trial.29 9
VII. SECTION 8: AwARD
Section 8 of the U.A.A. governs the requirements for the arbitration
award.300 It requires the award to be in writing, signed by the arbitrators, and
delivered to each party as provided for in the agreement.3"' The award must
also be made within the time specified in the agreement or within the time ordered
by the court." 2 A party must make an objection to a late award before the
award is delivered or else the objection will be waived.303
In National Avenue Building Co. v. Stewart,"°4 the Missouri Court of
Appeals defined the standard of review of the actual award document as follows:
"Regardless of how a court might interpret an agreement, arbitrators do not exceed
their powers if their interpretation, even if erroneous, nevertheless is rationally
grounded in the agreement. "30 5 In Stewart, the agreement required the award to
be presented as a net change proviso.0  Upon evaluation of the agreement, the
court found that this requirement was not as specific as the party seeking review
contended. 30 7 Further, the court found that the arbitrators' interpretations were
reasonably grounded in the agreement.0 ' Thus, despite the fact that the
arbitrators' interpretation of the agreement differed from the parties' view, the
arbitrators "did not exceed their powers."
30 9
VIII: SECTION 9: CHANGE OF AwARD BY ARBITRATORS
Section 9 of the U.A.A. governs the modification or correction of an award
by the arbitrator on application of a party or a court.
310
In Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics and Allied Workers International Union,
Local 182b v. Excelsior Foundry Co.,3 the union filed an arbitration grievance
299. Id.
300. U.A.A. § 8.
301. U.A.A. § 8(a).
302. U.A.A. §8(b)
303. Id
304. 910 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
305. Id. at 349.
306. Id. at 348.
307. Id. at 350.
308. Id.
309. Id
310. U.A.A. § 9.
311. 56 F.3d 844 (7th Cir. 1995).
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on behalf of an employee who failed a drug test.112 The arbitrator's decision
required the employee to complete a drug rehabilitation program within sixty days
of the award.3" 3 The award, however, failed to establish who would pay for the
program." 4 After negotiations with the company failed, the arbitrator was asked
to intervene and clarify the issue of payment."' When the employee was finally
able to enroll in the program and successfully complete it, the sixty days set out
in the award had elapsed.1 6 The arbitrator, however, again intervened and
stated that the sixty days had not started to run until the date the arbitrator
clarified the award as to payment for the drug program. 17 The company refused
to reinstate the employee, and the employee brought suit to compel reinstatement
as per the arbitrator's decision.31 "
The lower court granted the employer's summary judgment motion against
the employee's suit because an arbitrator is barred from revisiting the award by
the doctrine of functus officio. 319 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
however, placed the facts of this case within the clarification-completion exception
to the doctrine. 21 This exception provides that the arbitrator must clarify the
award within a reasonable period of time.32' The court reasoned that arbitrators,
like judges, are susceptible to mistakes and fallibility.322 To hold an arbitrator
to a higher standard than judges would reduce the utility of arbitration in the
marketplace and would be contrary to the policy favoring arbitration under Illinois
law. 323
The employer argued that section 9 of the U.A.A. only allowed twenty days
for a party to request a modification.324  The court stated that although the
U.A.A. appears to be written more narrowly than Illinois law so as to exclude
requests for clarification, the Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act specifically excludes
labor arbitration from its scope of coverage, thereby allowing the decision to be
reached under Illinois common law.325
312. Id.
313. Id. at 845.
314. Id
315. Id. at 845-46.




320. Id at 948.
321. Id.
322. Id. a 847.
323. Id




Chamblee et al.: Chamblee: Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
IX: SECTION 11: CONFIRMATION OF AN AWARD
Section 11 of the U.A.A. provides that the court shall confirm an award upon
application of a party unless grounds are imposed urging for a vacation,
modification, or correction of the award within the time limits. 26 If such
grounds are timely imposed, the court shall proceed as provided in U.A.A.
Sections 12 and 13.327 The confirmation of an award is normally required unless
a party presents grounds for modification or vacation of an arbitration award. 28
Following the mandate of Section 11, most courts confirm arbitration awards.
In American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Department
of Central Management Services,12 9 the Appellate Court of Illinois held that a
labor arbitration award must usually be enforced if the arbitrator acts within the
scope of his authority.33° The narrow exception to this rule is when an award
violates public policy.33' The court did not extend this public policy exception
to permit the disregard of the time limitations set forth in public collective
bargaining agreements.332 The court also noted that the public policy exception
had never been upheld in a case pertaining to the discharge of public employees
covered by collective bargaining agreements.333
Although an arbitration award is normally confirmed, courts do apply section
11 of the U.A.A. to the award to be modified. In FCR Greensboro, Inc. v. C and
M Investments of High Point, Inc.,334 the Court of Appeals of North Carolina
stated that although public policy favored confirmation of awards, such arbitration
awards were not infallible.33 In this case, the arbitrator entered an award on a
matter that was not submitted to him.336  The court held that the record
presented no evidence that the arbitration agreement provided for the
reimbursement of a sprinkler system addition that was part of the plaintiff's
"claimed liquidated damages" and "claimed tenant change orders."331  Based on
this lack of evidence, the court held that the arbitrator exceeded his authority and
that the trial court improperly confirmed that portion of the award.333
The language of section 1 1 requires that a party must apply to the court to









334. 459 S.E.2d 292 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).
335. Id. at 295.
336. Id The court relied on N.C. GEN. STAT. §1-567.14(aX2) (1995). Id
337. Id.
338. Id
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confirmation.339 Grubb and Ellis Co. v. First Colonial Trust Co. illustrates a
court's application of this section. 40 The Illinois U.A.A. expressly states that
an arbitrators' decisions on the merits of a case are not self-executing.
3 41
Instead, each arbitration award requires judicial confirmation before it can attain
the status of a judgment enforceable by execution.3 42 Under the llinois U.A.A,
the power to enforce arbitration awards rests exclusively in the court, rather than
in a nonjudicial arbitrator.343  The court analogized this same concept to
enforcement of a lien foreclosure to collect the proceeds of an award reading this
enforcement procedure as a purely judicial function.?"
In Gilliland v. Chronic Pain Ass 'n, Inc. ,345the court found that a nisi prius
order which denied confirmation of an arbitration award was appealable. 346 In
an evidentiary hearing for a breach of an employment contract claim, the judge
found that the arbitration process contained the appearance of improprieties, but
not fraud or collusion.
47
Nevertheless, the judge signed the nisi prius order was signed and suggested
that "the only remedy left" was to resubmit the dispute to another arbitarion
panel.34' The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, however, found that the nisi prius
order was appealable under Section 953 of the Oklahoma Statutes because it
created an "insuperable barrier" to the confirmation of the arbitration award and,
thus, precluded the desired relief from being obtained.
349
X. SECTION 12: VACATING AN AWARD
Courts have a very restricted review of arbitration awards under the
U.A.A. 350  This limited review retains the separate function of arbitration and
precludes courts from simply substituting their judicial review for the judgment
339. U.A.A. §11.
340. 1995 WL 549131 (N.D. IlL 1995).
341. Id. at *3. The court applied 710 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. 5/14 (West 1992).
342. Id. The court applied 710 ILL. COMe. STAT. ANN. 5/14 (West 1992).
343. Id
344. Id.
345. 904 P.2d 73 (Old. 1995).
346. Id. at 77.
347. Id. at 75.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 76. Section 953 of the Oklahoma Statutes states that:
An order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect,
determines the action and prevents a judgment and an order affecting a substantial right,
made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment
is a final order, which may be vacated, modified, or reversed, as provided in this article.
Id. (citing OKIA STAT. tit. 12, § 953 (1991)).
350. See Stockade Enterprises v. AH., 905 P.2d 156, 157 (Mont 1995) (citing May v. First
National Pawn Brokers, LTD., 887 P.2d 185, 187 (1994)).
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of the arbitrators chosen by the parties. 5' If the review were not so limited, the
arbitration award would become the commencement of litigation instead of the
end. 3
52
One jurisdiction has expanded the scope of judicial review slightly. If an
arbitration award violates a "well-defined" and "dominant" public policy, it allows
the court to vacate the award beyond the enumerated provisions in the U.A.A 53
The Nevada Supreme Court expanded the limited review provided under the
U.A.A. by concluding that the U.A.A. provisions are not exclusive.354 The court
held that despite the restriction of the district court's power of review to statutory
grounds, if "an arbitrator manifestly disregards the law, [then] a reviewing court
may vacate an arbitration award." 3"
A. Procurement of Award by Corruption, Fraud or Other Undue Means
The U.A.A. directs the court to vacate an arbitration award which was
procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means.356 Courts generally affinn
an arbitration award, unless the arbitrator's conduct exceeded the bounds of
propriety.
357
In Wojdak v. Greater Philadelphia Cablevision, Inc., the court held that since
the U.A.A. uses the term "undue means" in conjunction with "corruption" and
"fraud", "undue means" refers to conduct that is far outside the bounds of
propriety.358 The limited partners of Greater Philadelphia Cablevision, Inc.
("Cablevision") wanted to sell their interests to the general partners. According
to the partnership agreement, if a price could not be agreed upon, an appraiser
would determine it.31" Without notifying the parties, the appraiser applied a 35%
discount by consulting with cable television investors on the issue of
valuation.3' The limited partners filed to vacate the appraisal as to the
discount.361' The trial court vacated the appraisal, finding that it was procured
by undue means because the appraisers went outside Cablevision without notifying
the partners. 62 The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the trial court's
decision, concluding that the appraiser's action did not rise to "undue means"
351. See Hecla Mining Co. v. Bunker Hill Co., 617 P.2d 861, 867 (Idaho 1980) (citing Burchell
v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854)).
352. Id
353. Arizona Elec, Power Coop. v. Berkely, 59 F.3d 988, 991 (9th Cir. 1995).
354. Graber v. Comstock Bank, 905 P.2d 1112, 1115 (Nev. 1995).
355. Id. at 1115-16 (quoting Winchinsky v. Mosa, 847 P.2d 727, 731 (Nev. 1993)).
356. U.A.A. §12(a)(1).
357. Wojdak v. Greater Philadelphia Cablevision, Inc., 664 A.2d 587, 592 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
358. Id.
359. Id. at 589.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 590.
362. Id.
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because the technique used by the appraiser was not improper. 63 When the
parties agreed to be bound by a private appraisal, they were relying upon the
appraiser's expertise.36 The court found that applying the discount was part of
that expertise.365 The court also found that the limited partners had full
opportunity to express their opposition to the discount.366
In Patton v. J. C. Penney Insurance Co., 367 the court held that there was
no fraud, misconduct, corruption or other irregularity where there was a mix-up
and the incorrect arbitrator for Hanover decided an award with J.C. Penny's
arbitrator in J.C. Penny's favor.36 The plaintiff was injured in an accident
involving two drivers. One of the drivers was insured by J.C. Penney and the
other by Hanover.369 The policies issued by Hanover and J.C. Penney provided
for arbitration of claims which could not be amicably settled. 370 During the
arbitration, there was a mix up and Daniel J. Ryan, not Daniel Ryan Jr., appeared
at the hearing as an arbitrator for Hanover (also a defendant in the suit).371
Subsequently, the mistake was discovered and the correct arbitrator, Daniel Ryan
Jr., signed the award even though he did not participate in the actual decision-
making process.372 J.C. Penny was found not to be liable for Patton's uninsured
motorist claim.37 3 The superior court recognized that the arbitration award in
favor of Hanover was properly vacated due to misconduct by the arbitrators.
3 74
On the other hand, the court affirmed the trial court's refusal to vacate the award
for J.C. Penney on the basis of misconduct in formulation since the J.C. Penney
arbitrator participated in the entire arbitration process with the incorrect Hanover
arbitrator. 75
This court adopted the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' rule which establishes
that part of an arbitration award may be affirmed as long as it is separable from
and not dependent on the rest of the award. 7 6 The court concluded that the
vacation of the Hanover award does not necessarily mean that the award in favor
of J.C. Penney was tainted by the Hanover misconduct.
377




367. 665 A.2d 510 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
368. Id. at 513.
369. Id. at 511.
370. Id.
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In National Avenue Building Co. v. Stewart,"' an arbitration award in favor
of Stewart was vacated by the trial court because it was procured by several undue
means.3 79  First, the trial court found that the arbitration panel used undue
means to reach its decision because it failed to require Stewart to set forth a
definite statement of his claim before the arbitration hearing.38 The appellate
court, however, held that the trial court erred in vacating the award based on
procurement by undue means.38' Adopting the Supreme Court of Arkansas'
definition of undue means, the appellate court concludedthat "undue" is something
similar to fraud and corruption.3 The appellate court concluded that there was
no indication in the record that the arbitrators' failure to grant National's request
that Stewart make his amended claim more definite was motivated by bad faith or
corruption.38 3 in addition, National only made a conclusional allegation that it
was prejudiced by the arbitrator's failure to enforce the motion."
Second, the trial court held that the arbitrator used undue means when he
failed to require Stewart to produce documentary evidence for National to review
prior to the arbitration.3"5 The appellate court held that the trial court's vacation
of this award based on procurement by undue means was in error.38 6 The
appellate court noted that the findings of fact identified no specific documents
which were admitted into evidence without being inspected by National prior to
the hearing.3" In addition, National made no clear objections to the evidence
as it was admitted during the arbitration proceedings.3" The appellate court also
stated that arbitrators exercising their good judgment are to decide all questions
as to the admission or rejection of evidence.389 The appellate court concluded
that there was no evidence that the arbitrators used anything but their honest
judgment to admit the exhibits.390 Additionally, the appellate court noted that
National did not demonstrate any prejudice from the receipt of the undisclosed
documents into evidence.3 91
Third, the trial court determined that through his expert witness Stewart
engaged in an effort to confuse and mislead National as to Stewart's claim and
378. 910 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
379. Id. at 346-47.
380. Id. at 344.




385. Id. at 344.
386. Id. at 347.
387. Id. at 346.
388. Id.
389. Id. (citing Gozdor v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 216 N.W.2d 436, 437 (Mich. 1974)).
390. Id.
391. Id. at 347.
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supporting evidence.392 Based on this finding, the trial court vacated the award
concluding that it was procured by undue means.3 93
The arbitration was not conducted entirely "by ambush. 3 94 The arbitrators
commanded Stewart's expert witness, Curd, to appear at the preliminary hearing
and to bring certain documents.395 Curd then attended that proceeding and
nothing indicates that he failed to bring the requested information. 9
The appellate court stated that even though National did not receive the
benefit of the comprehensive discovery available in lawsuits, the absence of
unlimited discovery does not justify vacating an arbitration award.391  The
appellate court went on to note that in the arbitration record containing Curd's
testimony, National did not object to any of Curd's testimony on the ground that
he refused to answer questions at a deposition nor did National request that Curd
be barred from testifying.398 The court also found that National identified no
specific prejudice resulting from Curd's refusal to answer questions at the
deposition. 99
B. Arbitrator Partiality, Misconduct and Bias
Since the courts have such a limited review of arbitration awards, it is
important that the awards are procured fairly. Therefore, the U.A.A. provides that
an award can be vacated when there is evident partiality by the arbitrator
appointed as a neutral, corruption by any of the arbitrators, or misconduct
prejudicing the rights of any party.400 An award will not be vacated due to
partiality, interest, or bias, unless their existence is direct and specific.40' For
example, if bias is allegedly due to a relationship between the arbitrator and a
party, the award will not be vacated if the relationship is remote or has no affect
on the arbitrator's interest in the outcome of the hearing.402
In Lancaster v. West,4 3 the court held that in order to vacate an arbitration
award, the interest, partiality, or bias must be certain and direct rather than remote,
speculative, or uncertain.4' Lancaster presented no specific testimony that the
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 348,
395. Id at 347.





401. Lancaster v. West, 891 S.W.2d 357, 361 (Ark. 1995) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v.
Dieslinger, 711 S.W.2d 771 (Ark. 1986)).
402. TUCO Inc. v. Burlington Northern R.R., 912 S.W.2d 311, 318 (Tex. CL App. 1995).
403. 891 S.W.2d 357 (Ark. 1995).
404. Id. at 361.
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arbitrators were impartial.4"5 The court deemed Lancaster's statment that it was
her "belief that certain members were not impartial" to be insufficient to vacate
the award on the grounds of bias.4"
In TUCO, Inc. v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co.," the parties arbitrated
the proper construction to be given specific portions of shipping contracts.4°
TUCO selected Hardy as its arbitrator, and the carriers (Burlington and other
shippers) selected Cole.4' The parties then submitted lists of potential
candidates for the third arbitrator's position. 0 Beall's nameappeared on both
lists and was selected. 41 ' After Beall's selection, but prior to the
commencement of the arbitration proceeding, Beall accepted Mullan as a
client.412 Mullan was previously represented by a law firm with which arbitrator
Cole was associated.413 This fact was not brought to the attention of the
parties. 4 4 During the arbitration, TUCO's attorney became aware of the referral
from Cole's law firm to Beall, but no objections were made.41 5
The arbitration award was made in favor of the carriers with Hardy
dissenting, Hardy claimed that the award was the result of actual bias by
Beall.4 6 TUCO sought to vacate the award in district court based on evident
partiality by Beall.4" The district court recognized that this argument rested
largely on TUCO's position that Hardy and Cole were "party" arbitrators, favoring
the parties that chose them. Beall was to be the neutral arbitrator. The problem
arose because Beall's relationship with a "party" arbitrator was the same as a
relationship with a party and, therefore, compromised Beall's authority. 4 18 The
court not only recognized that the Texas General Arbitration Act, which is based
on the U.A.A, adopts this "party" arbitrator theory, but it also looked to other
jurisdictions and concluded that the carriers did not rebut the absence of evident
partiality.419 The court determined that a neutral arbitrator is under a duty to
reveal any relationship which might reasonably create the appearance of partiality
or bias.420 The court stated that a relationship does not reasonably create the
appearance of partiality if it is remote or has no affect on the arbitrator's interest
405. Id
406. Id.
407. 912 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
408. Id. at 312.





414. Id. at 314.
415. Id.
416. Id
417. Id. at 315.
418. Id. at 316.
419. Id. at 318.
420. Id.
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in the outcome of the proceedings.421 Therefore, since the carriers did not rebut
the appearance of partiality, the case was reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.
422
In Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Berkeley,42 Berkeley, an
attorney, made a claim against his client for an unpaid bill under a contingent fee
arrangement (CFA) which provided for arbitration in the case of a dispute.
24
The parties could not select a neutral third arbitrator."' Finally, each party
agreed to list six candidates from an American Arbitration Association (AAA) list.
If a common candidate was listed, then he would be selected.42 6 If not, each side
would choose a candidate from the other's list, and the AAA would randomly
choose the third arbitrator from those two candidates.42 Because the parties did
not select a common candidate, the AAA randomly chose Pfeiffer, a candidate
Berkeley had nominated, to be the third arbitrator.4 2S Upon notification of his
selection, Pfeiffer disclosed that Berkeley had been on the staff of the Civil
Aeronautics Board during the time that Pfeiffer served as a hearing examiner for
that agency from 1947 to 196 1.429 Pfeiffer stated that he and his wife had
visited Berkeley and his wife on two occasions, and he had lunch with Berkeley
one or two times after he left the agency. 3 Pfeiffer went on to say that he had
no further contact with Berkeley for at least twenty-seven years. 3'
A majority of the arbitration panel found that Berkeley was entitled to
$9,221,000.00 in contingent legal fees, but this was to be reduced by 15% in
satisfaction of Arizona Electric Power Cooperative's ("AEPCO") counterclaimfor
breach of fiduciary duty.432 AEPCO brought suit to vacate the award claiming
that Pfeiffer was biased in favor of Berkely. 43 3 The court concluded that the
award should be confirmed since there was no "evident partiality" as required by
§12-1512(A) of the Arizona Revised Statutes.434
AEPCO unsuccessfully tried to persuade the court that the test for
establishing bias should be more rigorous in cases where arbitrators are not experts
in the field.4 " AEPCO based this assertion on the fact that courts often premise
their reluctance to find bias on the assumption that the parties have traded
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. 59 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 1995).
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impartiality for expertise. 436 The court stated that no court has ruled that a non-
expert arbitrator's impartiality should be tested by a higher standard.43 The
court also looked to federal law to determine that "the appearance of impropriety,
standing alone, is insufficient to establish bias. ' 438 Instead, the party alleging
bias must prove specific facts that create reasonable impressions of partiality.
439
The court concluded that a social relationship which ended over twenty-seven
years ago is not sufficient to demonstrate bias"40 and that AEPCO failed to point
to any facts in the hearing that showed bias.441
In National Avenue Building Co. v. Stewart,442 evidence was introduced
during the arbitration regarding what role Hood-Rich, the architect, played in the
construction project. This was the basis of the dispute between the parties." 3
After the completion of the arbitration hearing, National's counsel, Evans, was
talking with their expert witness, Dr. Morris, within a few feet of Findley, an
arbitrator in the case.44" During this conversation, Evans spoke in a tone which
would allow Findley to overhear the substance of their conversation.445 Evans
told Morris that National approved of his presentation and that he would
recommend to National that Evans be used as a consultant in the pending lawsuit
they had filed against Hood-Rich. 45  Directly after the conversation, Findley
called Evans aside and initiated a conversation in which Findley offered to serve
as an expert consultant to National in a related lawsuit against Hood-Rich." 7
The trial court vacated the award and concluded that Findley was biased because
Findley's services as an expert consultant to National in a related lawsuit would
only be required if the panel entered an award for Stewart and against
National.448
The appellate court, however, held that the trial court erred in vacating the
award due to partiality.449 The court concluded that an arbitrator is not
precluded from developing views as to the merits of a dispute early in the
arbitration.45" An award should not be vacated on the ground of evident
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id. (quoting Toyota ofBerkelyv. Automobile Salesmen's Union Local 1095, 834F.2d 751,




442. 910 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. Ct App. 1995).
443. Id. at 341.
444. Id, at 341-42.




449. Id. at 343-44.
450. Id. at 343.
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partiality just because an arbitrator expresses those views on the matters at
hand.45" ' As long as an arbitrator's opinion arises from the evidence and conduct
of the parties, it cannot be claimed that the expression of such opinion amounts
to bias." The appellate court also noted that the bias or interest of the arbitrator
must be definite, direct, and capable of demonstration in order to show evident
partiality.45 a In this case, the court concluded that the possibility that National
would accept Findley's assistance in its suit against Hood-Rich was too speculative
to constitute a financial interest in the outcome of the present arbitration,
especially where the offer was uninvited by National.
454
In Cotterman v. Allstate Insurance Co.,"-' an arbitration award was granted
in favor of Cotterman, the insured.456 After Allstate's timely petition to vacate
the award was denied, Allstate contended on appeal that the arbitrators' award
should be vacated on the ground that the arbitrators erred in denying Allstate's
pre-arbitration requests to examine the insured under oath. 457 Allstate alleged
that this examination would have allowed it to conduct an investigation into
Cotterman's pre-existing conditions and into the validity of his alleged
damages.45 Allstate claimed that this denial was contrary to law and constituted
misconduct by the arbitrators under the Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration Act.459
Allstate also argued that Cotterman had broken a provision in the insurancepolicy
which imposed a duty on the insureds to cooperate in a settlement.4 This
breach, in turn, denied Allstate a full and fair hearing. 6'
Denying the petition, the court stated that Allstate's argument failed on both
grounds. 62 The court determined that the arbitrators exercised their discretion
and found that an examination under oath of Cotterman was not a condition
precedent to beginning arbitration proceedings. 63  Because making the
exmaination a conditionn precedent did not amount to misconduct and did not
deprive Allstate of a fair hearing, the award did not require vacating.4' The
court also decided that the "contrary to law" standard of the 1927 U.A.A. was not
applicable to this case which applied the 1980 U.A.A.465
451. Id. See also Spector v. Torenberg, 852 F. Supp. 201, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
452. National Avenue, 910 S.W.2d at 343.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. 666 A.2d 695 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
456. Id. at 697.
457. Id at 699.
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. Id. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §7309(B) (1985).
461. Id. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §7309(BX1985).
462. Couerman, 666 A.2d at 699.
463. Id at 700. See Pensylvania General Ins. Co. v. Barr, 435 Pa. 456, 459 (1969).
464. Cotterman at 700.
465. Id at 699.
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C. Arbitrator Exceeding the Scope of Authority
An arbitration award may be vacated if arbitrators exceed their authority
when deciding the award. 4" The scope of an arbitrator's authority is determined
by the parties' agreement.467 Failure of an arbitrator to follow the law as a court
would have does not render the award vacated due to an arbitrator exceeding his
power. 6'
In In re Estate of Sandefur v. Greenway, Sandefur presented a claim for
actual damages of $200,000 against her securities broker, Greenway, alleging
securities fraud, common law fraud, forgery, and churning.4 69 Greenway had
affiliated offices with Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc (Shearson) after accepting
Sandefur's account. 70
During arbitration of the claim, Shearson settled for $150,000. 47'
Subsequently, Sandefur died and the arbitrators awarded her estate $149,200 in
actual damages and assessed costs and fees against Greenway. 472 The award was
then presented to the circuit court for confirmation and the court found that the
award was subject to set off under the Missouri Setoff Statute. 473 Accordingly,
the court reduced the award to zero since the estate received a settlement from
Shearson for an amount greater than the amount assessed for Sandefur's damages
by the arbitrators.474
The appellate court concluded that the trial court did not have the power to
vacate the award based on the set-off statute. 4" The court determined that even
if the arbitrators chose to ignore Missouri's set-off law and even though its
decision led to a double recovery, the award could not be set aside by the
court 476 The court further stated that "the [arbitrator's] failure to follow the law
as a court would have done, without agreement to do so in the contract, does not
afford relief through the courts."477 The arbitration agreement did not bind the
arbitrators to follow Missouri law, and a disregard for the law is not a statutory
bases for vacating an award under the Missouri Uniform Arbitration Act.478
466. U.A.A. §12(a)(3).
467. Id.
468. In re Estate of Sandefur v. Greenway, 898 S.W.2d 667 (Mo.CLApp. 1995) (quoting Stifel,
Nicolaus & Co. v. Francis, 872 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Mo.Ct.App. 1994)).
469. Id. at 669.
470. Id at 668.
471. Id.
472. Id
473. Mo.Rev.Stat. §537.060 (1994).
474. Sandefur, 898 S.W.2d at 669.
475. Id. at 670.
476. Id.
477. Id. (quoting Francis, 872 S.W.2d at 486).
478. Id. See also Western Waterproofing Co. v. Lindenwood Colleges, 662 S.W.2d 288, 291-92
(Mo.CLApp. 1983).
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Therefore, the arbitrators did not exceed their powers and the award cannot be
relitigated.
479
In Perkins Restaurants Operating Co. v. Van Den Bergh Foods Co.,48
Perkins purchased an allegedly defective oven from Van Den Bergh.481' A
provision of the purchase agreement submitted all disputes to arbitration and
awarded the "prevailing party" reasonable attorney fees. 4' During arbitration,
the panel requested briefs from both sides regarding the definition of "prevailing
party. ' 4' The arbitrators awarded Perkins $10,000 but refused to award attorney
fees to either party.4' The arbitration award was confirmed by the circuit
court.
48 5
Perkins appealed asserting that the arbitrators exceeded the scope of their
authority by failing to award attorney fees as provided for in the agreement. 46
Perkins contended that the term "prevailing party" has a clear and unambiguous
meaning." The court noted that "an arbitrator has no authority to ignore the




A contract term will be found ambiguous, however, where it is reasonably
susceptible to more than one interpretation. 4' 9 The court stated that an arbitrator
exceeds his authority when he makes decisions upon matters which were not
submitted to him.4 9° If, however, the award is within the submission and
contains an honest decision after a full and fair hearing, a court will not set it
aside for errors of fact or law.49 Concluding that the arbitrators were fully
briefed on the issue by both sides, the court determined that neither party was
entitled to attorney fees and refused to vacate the award.49
In Graber v. Comstock Bank,493 Graber petitioned the court to vacate an
arbitration award, claiming that the arbitrator ruled on issues outside the scope of
the agreement when after the award was issued, the district court remanded the
case to the arbitrator to clarify three findings.494 Graber claimed that the scope
of the arbitration process was restricted by the Bank's request for relief in its
479. Sandefur, 898 S.W.2d at 670.
480. 657 N.E.2d 1085 (M. App. Ct 1995).
481. Id at 1086.
482. Id.





488. Id. at 1088. See Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc. v. Hedrich, 639 N.E.2d 228 (IlL App. CL
1994).
489. Perkins, 657 N.E.2d at 1088.
490. Id.
491. Id. at 1089.
492. Id.
493. 905 P.2d 1112 (Nev. 1995).
494. Id. at 1117.
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complaint for declaratory judgement.495 The court concluded that the issues
addressed in the arbitrator's clarification were within the scope of the arbitration
since the district court's order to arbitrate included "all disputes, actions, claims
or controversies arising out of. . .any aspect of the past, present or future
relationship of the parties."'4 96 The court also noted that in Graber's brief that
was sent to the arbitrator, Graber agreed to submit to arbitration any and all
disputes arising out of the dealings between these parties.4 The court went on
to say that during the arbitration proceeding, Graber argued issues beyond those
in the Bank's initial complaint.498
In Tim Huey Corp. v. Global Bolier and Mechanical, Inc.,419 the court
refused to vacate an arbitration award where the appellant asserted that the
arbitrators exceeded their authority. 0 The arbitrators awarded Global Bolier
money damages for extra work under a construction contract. This award
contradicted the provision in the contract that Global Bolier waived all claims to
compensation unless it submitted written change orders.5' The court concluded
that this did not warrant vacating the award since the arbitrators may have found
that such provisions were waived."°
In Chicoine v. Bignall,50 3 the court determined that an award could not be
vacated in a negligence suit where it was alleged that an arbitrator exceeded his
powers by finding no negligence due to lack of causation when the defendant had
already confessed.0 4  Chicoine sued an attorney, Bignall, for malpractice
because Bignall failed to make a timely motion for a new trial." 5 The parties
agreed to submit the matter to arbitration.50 6 The arbitrator concluded that
causation was missing and entered judgment for Bignall. °7 Chicoine sought to
have the award vacated on the grounds that the arbitrator exceeded his powers.50 8
The court concluded that an arbitrator exceeds his powers when he decides
an issue that is not submitted to him by the parties or that exceeds the bounds of
the contract between the parties."' Because the issue to be decided was whether





499. 649 N.E.2d 1358 (III. App. Ct. 1995).
500. Id. at 1364, 1366.
501. Id. at 1364.
502. Id. at 1365.
503. 899 P.2d 438 (Idaho 1995).
504. Id. at 441.
505. Id. at 439.
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the arbitrator did not exceed any limitation contained in the parties'
stipulation.
510
In National Avenue Building Co. v. Stewart,"' the parties agreed to allow
the arbitrators "to construe the arbitration award as a net change order which set
forth the original contract with the two change orders and then noted a net
difference."51 2  National argued that the arbitrators exceeded their powers
because the award was "totally inconsistent with the authority granted to the
arbitrators as to how the award should be set forth." ' The trial court vacated
the award in favor of Stewart, concluding that the arbitrators exceeded their
authority since the award was not set forth as a net change order." 4
The appellate court stated that when determining whether the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, courts recognize that it is for the aribtrator, not the courts,
to determine the construction of contracts involved in arbitration proceedings.5"5
Based on this deference to the arbitrators, the appellate court concluded that
arbitrators do not exceed their powers if their interpretation of a contract, even if
erroneous and contrary to how a court might interpret it, is rationally grounded in
the agreement. 6 The appellate court determined that although the arbitrators'
interpretation of the net change requirements differed from National's, the award
was rationally grounded in the net changeprovision, and as such the arbitrators did
not exceed their powers. 17
Also, the trial court in National vacated the award by concluding that the
arbitrators exceeded their powers when they refused to clarify their award in
conformance with the agreement.1 The appellate court also found this vacation
to be in error. It stated that the award was unambiguous and that nothing in the
statute authorized a court to vacate an award when an arbitrator refuses to clarify
the award. 9 The court went on to conclude that a court may only vacate an
award on the grounds set out in the statute.5 20
D. Refusal to Postpone Hearing or Hear Relevant Evidence
An arbitration award may be vacated if the arbitrators refuse to postpone a
hearing upon sufficient cause, refuse to hear evidence that is material to the
controversy, or conduct a hearing which prejudices one of the parties.5 '
510. Id.
511. 910 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
512. Id. at 348.




517. Id. at 350.
518. Id
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In Patton v. J.C. Penney Insurance Co.,522 the court refused to vacate an
award based on alleged prejudice to a party due to the arbitrator's refusal to
postpone an arbitration hearing.5 2 Patton filed claims against two insurance
companies, Hanover Insurance Co. and J.C.Penney Insurance Co., which insured
the drivers involved in an accident which injured Patton.5 24 Prior to arbitration,
there was a mix-up in the mailing of notices. Daniel Ryan, Jr. was supposed to
be the arbitrator representing Hanover. As a result of this mix-up, however,
Daniel J. Ryan appeared at the hearing instead of Daniel Ryan, Jr.525
Nevertheless, Daniel Ryan Jr. did sign the award following the arbitration
hearing.
526
The court refused to vacate the J.C. Penney award because the only
misconduct that Patton could allege was that she was denied a chance to address
the panel that signed the awards."r The court ruled that this may be the case
with the Hanover claim, but Patton had the opportunity to address the J.C. Penney
arbitrator who decided and signed the award.5 28 Therefore, the court held that
there were no facts to support Patton's claim of prejudice with respect to the J.C.
Penney award.5 29
E. Public Policy
Generally, the court's ability to vacate an arbitration award is limited to the
enumerated provisions of the U.A.A. A court, however, may be able to vacate an
award which contradicts a "well-defined" and "dominant" public policy by
broadening its powers under the U.A.A.53°
In Arizona Electric Power Cooperative (AEPCO) v. Berkely, AEPCO asserted
that an arbitration award granting unpaid contingent fees to Berkely violated the
public policy against paying unethical attorneys and, therefore, should be
vacated.5"' Arizona courts have not addressed whether they recognize a public
policy exception to the enforcement of arbitration awards.53 2
In Berkely, the court determined that it need not decide whether Arizona
should have a public policy exception because this award would not qualify for
such an exception anyway.533 Since there are no Arizona cases discussing a
522. 665 A.2d 510 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
523. Id. at 513.
524. Id. at 512.
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. Id. at 513.
528. Id
529. Id.
530. Arizona Elec. Power Coop. v. Berkely, 59 F.3d 988, 992. (9th Cir. 1995).
531. Id. at 991.
532. Id
533. l at 992.
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public policy exception, the court looked to federal law."34 Citing the test set
forth by the 9th Circuit in Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinists Lodge,535 the
court concluded that in "order to vacate an award due to public policy, a court
must articulate 'an explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy,' and it 'must
demonstrate that the policy is one that specifically militates against the relief
ordered by the arbitrator."''53" The court concluded that AEPCO failed to meet
the first prong of the Stead test.53' Since the public policy against fee collection
by unethical attorneys is fact-specific, it is not sufficiently "well-defined and
dominant" to qualify as a public policy exception. 34 Futhermore, the court in
Berkely cautioned that courts should be reluctant to use public policy as a reason
to vacate an arbitration award.535
In Schultz v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.,536 the court held that an
arbitration award which upholds an insurance contract can only be vacated due to
a violation of public policy if the insurance contract itself violates public
policy.537 The Schultzs' and their deceased son were insured by two policies
issued by Aetna.53 One policy provided liability coverage of $100,000, and the
other contained uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage of $35,000. 539 After
their son's death in a car accident, the Schultzs' sought $100,000 from Aetna for
coverage for each vehicle.54  Aetna responded that it only owed the Schultzs
$35,000 per vehicle. 4 Aetna supported this position with an option selection
signed by Mr. Schultz, Sr.542 According to Aetna, the option selection
constituted a request in writing for issuance of underinsured motorist coverage in
an amount less than the limits of liability for bodily injury. 43
The claim was submitted to arbitration, and the award was granted in favor
of Aetna. 44 The Schultzs' moved to vacate the award and claimed that they
were unaware of the lower limits provided in the policy.545 They offered two
explanations for being unaware.546 First, the statutorily required notice language
appeared on the back side of a two-sided sheet, and Mr. Schultz did not read the
534. Id.
535. 886 F.2d 1200 (9th Circ. 1990), cert denied, 495 U.S. 946 (1990).
536. Berkley, 59 F.3d. at 992 (quoting Stead, 886 F.2d at 1211).
537. Id.
534. Id.
535. Id. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987).
536. 663 A.2d 166 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
537. Id. at 168.
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back side prior to signing the application.547 Second, the signed application was
not attached to the policy which was issued to them 4 Therefore, the Schultzs
argued that Aetna's method of obtaining signatures on the waiver and notice
provisions violated public policy.549
The trial court ruled that these claims did not justify vacation of the award
since no public policy concerns about a specific clause were raised.5 ° The trial
court reasoned that an attack on the method used to obtain signatures and on
whether a particular statutory provision applies to the case are questions to be
addressed by the arbitration panel, not questions subject to review by the
court.55" ' Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision." 2
In Kelly v. State Farm Insurance Co., "' Michelle Kelly, eleven years old,
was killed while riding her bicycle when she was struck by a pick-up truck driven
by Mr. Alberti. 54 Michelle's parents ("Kellys") on behalf of Michelle's estate
brought a wrongful death action against Mr. Alberti, the bicycle manufacturer and
against the bicycle owner.55 Damages to Michelle's estate were estimated at
$600,000.56 Each of the defendants carried insurance.557  The parties settled
for the sum of $64,500 to which the Kellys' insurance carrier, State Farm,
consented and waived its subrogation rights.55
State Farm, however, refused to grant underinsured benefits to Michelle's
estate. 59 It denied this claim because the Kellys allegedly failed to comply with
the terms of an "exhaustion clause" in their policy."6 According to State Farm,
the exhaustion clause required the Kellys to receive the tortfeasor's liability limits
before they could claim underinsured motorist benefits. 6 Since Mr. Alberti
carried $50,000 worth of liability insurance and his portion of the settlement was
only $12,500, State Farm claimed the Kellys did not meet the conditions of the
exhaustion clause.5 62 Pursuant to the policy's arbitration provision, this dispute
was submitted to arbitration where the arbitration panel found in favor of State
Farm. 63 The Kellys moved to vacate the award alleging that it was contrary to
547. Id.
548. Id.
549. Id. at 167-68.
550. Id. at 168.
551. Id.
552. Id. at 169.
553. 668 A.2d 1154 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
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law and against public policy.) 64 The trial court denied their petition, concluding
that it had no jurisdiction to review a claim that an award was contrary to law and
that even if the panel could address the merits of the arbitration, it was not clear
that the decision violated precedent.165 The Kellys appealed.
5
'
The appellate court held that a court has the power to review an arbitration
award that is based on a provision in an insurance policy which is alleged to be
void as against public policy.567 The court concluded that this power of revision
gave the court jurisdiction where a claimant asserted that a particular provision
was contrary to public policy.5  The court reversed the trial court's decision
and determined that the clause must be interpreted to credit State Farm for the
$50,000 of the liability insurance carred by Mr. Alberti.5 69  Under this
interpretation, the Kellys were entitled to the full $30,000 of underinsurance that
they carried with State Farm.
170
In Doe v. Central Arkansas Transit,57 1 the appellate court reversed the trial
court's vacation of an arbitrator's award which had been previously vacated
because the arbitrator's reinstatement of a discharged employee violated public
policy.572 Doe, an employee of Central Arkansas Transit ("CAT"), was
discharged for testing positive for drug use.573 Filing a claim on her behalf, the
union claimed that Doe was not discharged for "just cause" as required under the
Collective Bargaining Agreement. 74  When the matter was submitted to
arbitration, the arbitrator reinstated Doe.575 CAT appealed to the trial court
which vacated the award because it violated the public policy against allowing
drug users to operate public transportation. 576 The appellate court concluded,
however, that this was not a well-defined and dominant public policy since it was
not derived from legal precedents and laws. 577 Therefore, the Doe court reversed
the trial court's vacation order, claiming it was impermissibly based on general




567. Id. at 1156.
568. Id.
569. Id at 1158.
570. Id
571. 900 S.W.2d 582 (Ark. Ct. App. 1995).
572. Id at 587-88.




577. Id at 585.
578. Id. Moreover, the concurring opinion recognized and found persuasive the public policy
of Arkansas which "favors arbitration as an alternative method of dispute resolution." Id. at 588.
1996]
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F The Exclusivity of Statutory Grounds to Vacate an Award
In Graber v. Comstock Bank,"9 the court concluded that the U.A.A.'s
grounds to vacate an arbitration award are not exclusive.5"0 The court decided
to follow the decision in Winchinsky v. Mosa that a district court's power of
review is restricted to statutory grounds unless "an arbitrator manifestly disregards
the law." ' If there is such a manifest disregard, a reviewing court may vacate
an arbitration award."8c In Graber, the court concluded that in the case at hand
the district court had the authority and obligation to review the award to determine
whether it manifestly disregarded the law.5 Review under this standard does
not permit plenary judicial review.5 Instead, a court should attempt to locate
arbitrators who appreciatethe significance of legal principles, but choose to ignore
them.85 Furthermore, for an award to be vacated due to a manifest disregard
of the law, the governing law that is alleged to be disregarded must be explicit,
well-defined, and clearly applicable.5"
In direct contradiction to the holding in Graber, the court in Dick v.
Dick" held that an arbitration award can only be vacatfor the reasons set out
in the statute.588 In Dick, the parties in a divorce proceeding agreed to submit
all issues of the divorce to arbitration. 9 The parties also agreed that any appeal
could only be based on the arbitrator's substantive decisions, not his procedural
decisions.5" The court concluded that since the parties invoked binding
arbitration, they were required to abide by the statute.59' Because the award did
not satisfy the justifications for vacation under the statute, the court refused to
vacate the award."92 Instead, the court reformed the agreement to comport with
the requirements of the statute.593
In Stockade Enterprises v. Ahl,594 Stockade sued AiM in an attempt to



















905 P.2d 1112 (Nev. 1995).
Id at 1115.
Id. at 1115-1116 (quoting Winchinsky v. Mosa, 847 P.2d. 727, 730-731 (Nev. 1993)).
Id. at 1115.
Id. at 1116.
Id. See City of Boulder v. General Sales Drivers, 694 P.2d 498 (Nev. 1985).
Graber, 905 P.2d at 1116. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808
933 (2d Cir. 1986).
Graber, 905 P.2d at 1116. See Bobky, 808 F.2d at 934.







905 P.2d 156 (Mont 1995).
Id a 156.
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the award was made in favor of Ahl.5 96 Stockade moved to "vacate or modify
the award on the grounds that the award was beyond the scope of inquiry, in error,
and contrary to law."5" Although the district court has the power to vacate the
award, it concluded that Stockade failed to raise one of the grounds required by
the Montana U.A.A. to trigger the district court's authority.5 98
The Montana Supreme Court, however, ruled that the district court was
incorrect in concluding that there was "no authority" for the court to set aside the
award.599 . The court reasoned that the Montana U.A.A. conferred authority on
the courts to vacate the award on statutory grounds.' The court also stated that
the party wishing to vacate an award bears the burden of alleging and proving that
one of the statutorily enumerated grounds exists.
611
In Tim Huey Corp. v. Global Boiler and Mechanical,'° the court ruled that
arbitration awards are not vacated for mere error and refused to vacate an
arbitration award which awarded Huey less than the cost to complete the contract
despite its ruling that Global had breached the construction contract with
Huey.6 3 The court further noted that it cannot correct such an insufficient
award where the parties have selected an alternate forum to resolve their
disputes.6"
Huey also argued that to affinr this award would violate public policy
because it would undermine public confidence in arbitration and discourage the use
of arbitration as a dispute resolution process.6 °5 The court rejected this agrument
and held that it will not enforce an arbitration award only if the award violates a
dominant and well-defined public policy that refers to laws and legal precedents,
but not if the award only violates general considerations of public interests. 6°6
XI. SECTION 13: MODIFICATION OR CORRECTION OF AWARD
As previously noted, courts traditionally have confirmed arbitration awards.
Section 13 states that the court must confirm an award as made unless the court
shall find grounds to modify or correct an award.' The court may modify or
correct an award if: "1) an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake
has occurred, 2) an arbitrator has awarded upon a matter not submitted to him/her,
596. Id.
597. Id
598. Id. at 158.
599. Id. a 157.
600. Id
601. Id. at 157-58.
602. 649 N.E.2d 1358 (IlL CL App. 1995).
603. Id.
604. Id. at 1364.
605. Id. at 1365.
606. Id.
607. U.A.A. § 13.
19961
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and 3) the award is imperfect in matter of form."6'8 An application to modify
or correct may be joined in the alternative with an application to vacate the
award.6
0 9
Courts have been rather stringent when applying this section of the U.A.A.
by specifically requiring parties to meet the statutory criteria to modify or correct
an award. According to FCR Greensboro, Inc. v. C and M Investments of High
Point,610 judicial review is limited to determining whether one of the specific
grounds for vacating or modifying an award exists.61'
In this case, the arbitrator awarded liquidated damages for late completion of
the project and awarded additional reimbursement for additions made to the
sprinkler system. 2 The builder filed a motion to vacate the award on the
grounds that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by awarding liquidated damages
which were not within the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement and by
awarding monies for changes concerning a controversy not within the scope of the
parties' arbitration agreement. 6 1' Relying on the language of section 13 of the
U.A.A. and finding that the arbitrator's award exceededhis authority, the appellate
court held that the trial court improperly confirmed the liquidated damages and
additional reimbursement portion of the award.6"4
This interpretation was noted in Stockade Enterprises v. Ahl.6 5 The
Montana Supreme Court found that the scope of judicial review of arbitration
awards was very limited under the Montana U.A.A.6 16 provisions which did not
permit the court to review the merits of controversies. 6 7 The statute provided
that the party seeking to modify or correct the award carried the burden of
alleging and proving that one of the statutory grounds existed.618 In this case,
the court held that because Stockade failed to address the statutory criteria set
forth in the Montana U.A.A., the district court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to vacate the award.619 The Montana Supreme Court rejected
Stockade's argument for an extremely broad scope of judicial review by holding
that neither the district court nor the court of appeals had any authority to engage
in a sufficiency of the evidence review.62
608. Id.
609. Id.
610. 459 S.E.2d 292 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).
611. Id at 294; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.13, 1-567.14 (1983).
612. FCR Greensboro, 459 S.E.2d at 292.
613. Id at 294.
614. Id. at 295.
615. Stockade, 905 P.2d at 156.
616. MONT. CODE ANN. 27-5-313(IX1985).
617. Stockade, 905 P.2d at 156.
618. Id at 157-58.
619. Id
620. Id
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In Cotterman v. Allstate,62' the Superior Court of Pennsylvania found that
the trial court did not err in refusing to modify the arbitrator's award which
reflected the $5,000 wage loss payment.622 The court upheld the award for loss
of household services as being within the arbitrator's discretion, noting that there
was no evidence of out-of-pocket expenses or concrete damages incurred by
plaintiff.
623
Allstate tried to argue that the award should have conformed to the
contractual liability limits of the policy. The court, however, held that the award
could only be modified if it met the statutory criteria of Pennsylvania's provision
to modify or correct the award.624 Since Allstate's argument did not fit within
any of the statutory criteria, the court found that it was without merit.
625
Most of the recent controversy surrounding section 13 involves the issue of
an arbitrator entering an award upon a matter not submitted to arbitration (i.e.,
where the arbitrator is exceeding his/her authority). For example, in Perkins
Restaurant v. Van Den Bergh Foods Co.,626 Perkins Restaurant asserted that the
arbitrator exceeded his authority by refusing to award plaintiff its attorney fees
since the arbitration agreement provided that the "prevailing party" shall receive
attorney fees.62 The Appellate Court of Illinois stated that courts must afford
arbitrators the presumption that they did not exceed their authority.628 Even an
arbitrator's gross abuse of discretion, according to the court, is not grounds for
modifying an arbitration award under Section 13.629 Furthermore, an illogical
or inconsistent decision on the part of the arbitrator is not a sufficient basis to
overturn an arbitration award.630 The court reasoned that an arbitrator exceeds
his authority when he decides matters which were not submitted to him, not when
he decides matters differently than the court would have reached.63 The court
concluded that as long as the arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement is
reasonable, it will not set aside the award.632 Since the arbitrator's decision was
reasonable in this case, the court concluded that the award was valid.633
621. 666 A.2d 695 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
622. Id. at 700. The court applied 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7302(d) and 7315 (1980). Id
623. Id.
624. Id. Pennsylvania's U.A.A. provides, in part, that:
an award may be modified only if the complaining party can demonstrate
that the award was miscalculated, that the arbitrators based the award
upon a matter not submitted to them, or that the award is deficient in
form, but which does not affect the merits of the arbitration decision.
PA. CONS. STAT. §7315(A) (1980).
625. Cotterman, 666 A.2d at 700.
626. 657 N.E.2d 1085 (IlL Ct. App. 1995).
627. Id. at 1086.
628. Id. at 1088.
629. Id.
630. Id.
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XlI. SECTION 14: JUDGMENT OF DECREE ON AWARD
Once the arbitration order has survived the obstacles of Section 12 and 13 of
the U.A.A., Section 14 provides that the judgment or decree shall be entered in
conformity with the U.A.A. and shall be enforced as any other judgment or
decree.6
3 4
In Sandefur v. Greenway,635 the Missouri Court of Appeals dealt with the
issue of an appeal that requested confirmation of an arbitration award in favor of
a customer against her stockbroker.636 Sandefur's estate was awarded actual and
punitive damages in an arbitration proceeding on the grounds that the stockbroker,
Greenway, committed securities fraud, common law fraud, forgery, and
churning.637 The trial court's confirmation of the award of punitive damages
prompted Greenway to appeal.63
The appellate court held that under Missouri's U.A.A., arbitration awards are
to be confirmed by the courts and given the status of judgments.639 A party
challenging the award is not entitled to a resolution on the merits since the court's
function is merely to determine if the arbitrator acted within his jurisdiction.' °
B ecause of the court's limited function, the court held that parties to an arbitration
agreement could not relitigate a matter on the law or facts.61 This, in effect,
gives arbitrators the ability to settle legal as well as factual issues with little
interference from the courts," 2 In this case, the court upheld the trial court's
decision that arbitrators could award Sandefur punitive damages.6
3
XIII. SECTION 17: JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Section 17 of the U.A.A. defines the court's jurisdiction to review the
arbitration award, as opposed to the arbitrator's jurisdiction or authority to hear
the issue. 1 4 The U.A.A. defines "court" as any court of competent jurisdiction
of this state."3 As established in Section 1, the arbitration agreement provides
634. U.A.A. § 14.
635. 898 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. CL App. 1995).
636. Id. at 668.
637. Id. at 669.
638. Id. The trial court found that a set-off was allowed as the Sandefur estate received a
settlement from Shearson, Lehman Brothers, Inc., Greenway's affliated office, which reduced the
actual damages to zero. Id.
639. Id. at 670. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 435.350-435.470 (1986).
640. Id at 670.
641. Id
642. Id
643. Id at 672.
644. U.A.A. § 17.
645. Id
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for arbitration in the state which confers jurisdiction on the court to enforce the
agreement under the U.A.A. and to enter judgment on an award."6
In MacDonald v. Hayman, 7 the parties filed a stipulation with the superior
court which reflected the parties' agreement to submit their dispute to binding
arbitration with no right to appeal.6" The case was submitted to arbitration in
which the arbitrators rendered a decision in favor of the Haymans. 649 The
Haymans then moved to have the award entered as a final judgment.65° Ten
days later, the superior court granted the Hayman's motion for final judgment.65'
The MacDonalds moved to be relieved of the judgment, arguing that the superior
court lacked jurisdiction under the Delaware U.A.A. to enter a final judgment on
the arbitrators' award in this case. 652 Though the superior court held that the
Delaware U.A.A. does vest jurisdiction in the Court of Chancery to enter a final
judgment on an arbitrator's award, the supreme court found that the court in this
case was not vested with such jurisdiction.6 53 The superior court did not obtain
jurisdiction over this dispute until the parties entered their arbitration agreement
in 1994, several years after the original complaint had been filed.654 Because of
this delay, the parties' later arbitration agreement did not "arise under" and was
not subject to the provisions of the Delaware U.A.A.6 55  As a result, the
superior court retained jurisdiction to enter the arbitrator's award as a final
judgment. 656
XIV. SECTION 19: APPEALS
The very essence of Section 19 is to define what is appealable. This section
provides that a party may appeal from an order: 1) denying an application to
compel arbitration, 2) granting an application to stay arbitration, 3) confirming or
denying confirmation of an award, 4) modifying or correcting an award, 5)
vacating an award without directing a rehearing, or 6) entering a judgment
pursuant to the U.A.A. 657
In Gilliland v. Chronic Pain Associates, Inc.,65 the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma held that to be appealable under Oklahoma's Arbitration Act, "an order
646. Id
647. No. 188, 1995 WL 449354, *1 (Del. July 27, 1995).




652. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 10, § 5701 (1974).
653. MacDonald, 1995 WL 449354 at* 1.
654. Id.
655. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5701 (1974).
656. Id
657. U.A.A. § 19.
658. 904 P.2d 73 (Okla. 1995).
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which 'prevents a judgment' must preclude the appealing party from proceeding
further in the case for the pursuit of the very relief that is then and there
sought."659 Because the nisi prius order precluded Gilliland from obtaining the
desired relief and barred judgment on the arbitration award tendered for
confirmation, the court held that it was appealable."6
Section 19 of the U.A.A. provides clear cut standards of the statutory
criteria to be used by parties appealing a decision. For instance, in Kemether v.
Aetna Life & Casualty Co., " the Superior Court of Pennsylvania found that
an order denying a petition to vacate or modify an award is not appealable under
the Pennsylvania U.A.A.62  After the court of common pleas denied the
Kemethers' petition to vacate or modify an arbitration award and reduced the
order denying relief to judgment, the Kemethers appealed.663 Aetna asserted that
this appeal must be quashed since an order denying a petition to vacate or modify
an arbitration award cannot be appealed.66  The appellate court held that the
responsibility for entering a confirming order lay with the trial judge, not the
appellate court.665 The appellate court also stated that the trial court's judgment
on the order denying the petition to vacate or modify was a final judgment.' 6
In this case, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that since the judgment was
considered final, the record failed to reveal any reason not to confirm the order
after the trial court denied the petition to vacate or modify. 67
A particularlyproblematic issue under Section 19 is whether a final judgment
addressing a particular issue has been reached. In Red Springs Presbyterian
Church v. Terminex,66 the Court of Appeals of North Carolina found that
because the parties were appealing from an order which denied in part and stayed
in part arbitration of plaintiff's claim against defendant, the appeal was
interlocutory.' 6 According to the court, the portion of the order that denied
arbitration was immediately appealable because a substantial right was
659. Id. at 77. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 953 (1991).
660. Id.
661. 656 A2d 125 (Pa. Super. Ct 1995).
662. Id at 127. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7320(a) (1982). The court noted that the
proper procedure is for the court to enter an order confirming the arbitrator's award, either
simultaneously with or following the entry of the order denying the petition to vacate or modify.
Kemether, 656 A.2d at 127.
663. Id. at 126.
664. Id. at 127.
665. Id
666. Id
667. Id. at 128. Subchapter A of the Pennsylvania UA.A. requires that an appealing party must
petition the court to vacate or modify the award. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§7314 and 7315 (1982).
The Kemethers filed the correct petition in accordance with the statute. Kemethers, 656 A.2d at 128.
668. 458 S.E.2d 270 (N.C. Ct App. 1995).
669. Id. at 272. The court noted that the arbitration was controlled by and under the provisions
of the North Carolina U.A.A., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§1.567.1-.2. Id
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involved.6 70 An order compelling arbitration, however, did not affect a
substantial right and, therefore, was not immediately appealable.67'
In Missouri, the Western District Court of Appeals in State ex rel. MCS
Building Co. v. KKMMedica 672 held that an order compelling arbitration was
not a final appealable order because the Missouri U.A.A. did not authorize an
appeal from an order compelling arbitration.673 The court held that the order
compelling the parties to arbitrate their disputes over the construction of a medical
office building did not dispose of all parties and all issues.674 According to the
court, "an appeal without statutory sanction conferred no authority upon an
appellate court except to enter an order dismissing the appeal." 67' The court
held that "ripe for review" was not one of the statutory listings of the Missouri
U.A.A. and, therefore, was not capable of appellate review.676
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District in Abrams v. Four
Seasons Lakesites followed the MCS Building decision.677  In Abrams, the
Southern District held that there was no final judgment from which an appeal
could be taken since the order denying the motion to compel did not dispose of
all parties and issues and failed to comply with the Rule 74.01(b) exception. 678
In this case, Abrams first brought an action for damages against the
condominium developer and officer for breach of contract and then moved to
compel arbitration.679 When his order to compel was denied, Abrams appealed
to the appellate court.680 The court noted that the Missouri U.A.A. allows
appeals from orders denying an application to compel arbitration."' Orders or
judgments, however, that otherwise partake of finality by reason of Missouri's
appeal process could only be appealed "in the manner and to the same extent as
appeals from orders or judgments in a civil case".' In a Missouri civil case,
"for a judgment to be final and appealable, it must dispose of all parties and all
issues in the case, leaving nothing for future determination".' The court noted
670. Id.
671. Id.
672. 896 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. Ct App. 1995).
673. Id. at 53. See Mo. RErV. STAT. §§435.440 and 435.330 (1986).
674. MCS, 896 S.W.2d at 53.
675. Id.
676. Id. See MO. REV. STAT. § 435.440 (1986).
677. 904 S.W.2d 37 (Mo. CL App. 1995).
678. Id. at 38.
679, Id.
680. Id. The trial judge denied Abrams' motion to compel arbitration concluding that he "failed
to prove the existence of a valid agreement between the parties to arbitrate." Id
681. Id. at 39. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.355 (1986) (proceedings to compel or stay arbitration).
682. Abrams, 904 S.W.2d at39. Section 435.400.1(1) provides inpertinentpart: "An appealmay
be taken from an order denying an application to compel arbitration under § 435.355." Mo. REV.
STAT. §435.400.1 (1986).
683. Abrams, 904 S.W.2d at 39. Section 435.440(2) states that an appeal shall be taken in the
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that an exception to the aforementioned rule exists in Missouri Court Rule
74.01(b) which permits appeals from a judgment that disposes of less than all
parties and issues if the trial court makes an "express determination that there is
no just reason for delay".' Because the order of the trial court in Abrams did
not dispose of all parties and all issues and because the trial court did not state in
its determination that there was no just reason for delay, the court held that the
order denying arbitration was not appealable." 3
The issue of possible appeal may become even more confusing when various
orders are delivered. For instance, in National Avenue Building Co. v.
Stewart,6 6 the trial court issued an order which denied confirmation of the
award, vacated the award, and directed a rehearing.8 7 Because the trial court
issued all three orders, National Avenue Building Company (NABC) claimed that
the Missouri U.A.A. provision governing appeals barred Stewart's appeal.6m If
Stewart was barred from appealing, the court held that he must arbitrate again.6
If NABC was dissatisfied with the result of the new arbitration, it could seek a
trial court order vacating the new award and directing another rehearing.690 If
NABC was successful in the vacating motion, Stewart would have to arbitrate a
third time.6 9' According to the Missouri CoArt of Appeals, this cycle could
continue indefinitely.6' The court found nothing in the Missouri U.A.A.
suggesting that if an order was appealableunder one subdivision, appealability was
extinguished if the order was unappealable under another.693 A party could
manipulate the system if a party sought an order vacating the award and directing
a rehearing and if the trial court entered such an order. Such an order would be
unappealable because neither subparagraph 3 nor subparagraph 5 of section
435.400.1 of Missouri's U.A.A. conferred appealability. 694  The court in
National held that the order was appealable, basing appealability on subparagraph
3 which allows an appeal of an order denying confirmation of an award.695 The
court specifically noted, however, that it was not implying that the order would
have been appealable absent the provision denying confirmation.696
684. Abrams, 904 S.W.2d at 39.
685. Id.
686. 910 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. Ct App. 1995).
687. Id. at 338.
688. Id. The provision provides that a party may appeal from an order vacating an award without
directing a rehearing. Mo. REV. STAT. §435.440(5) (1986).




693. Id. at 341.
694. Id. Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.440(3) (1986) provides that an appeal may be taken from an
order denying confumation of an award.
695. Id. The court noted that this holding was consistent with Missouri public policy which
allows an appeal from an order granting a new trial in a civil case. Id
696. Id.
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Other courts have tried to simplify the matter by looking to the actions of the
trial court. In Britt v. Phoenix Indemnity Insurance Co.,6' the Supreme Court
of New Mexico affirmed the trial court's decision to refer to arbitration the
question of whether a passenger was entitled to recover from an uninsured
motorist and uninsured motorists benefits. 69 The court found that an order
compelling arbitration was final if it was the "last deliberative action of the court
with respect to the controversy before it.,,699 In other words, as far as the merits
of the controversy are concerned, the court was finished with the case when it
went to the arbitrators.7" Therefore, the trial court's order to compel arbitration
was final for purposes of appeal and did not exceed the trial court's power in the
form of the award.70 1 The construction of the contract as to the award is within





697. 907 P.2d 994 (N.M. 1995).
698. Id. at 996. The court noted N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7-2(A) (Michie 1978), which provides
that if an agreement to arbitrate exists, the court shall order parties to proceed to arbitration. Id. at n. 1.
699. Id.
700. Id.
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